Abstract
Public servants operate in contexts that have been shaped by years of institutional reform. One significant development has been the advent of political staff in executive government. For public servants, the arrival of this new class of actor on the terrain of the core executive can present as an opportunity and as a risk. Contestability in the process of the development of policy is typically viewed as a virtue. However, forms of politicization that militate against the provision of advice that is both responsive and responsible – speaking truth to power, including truths that may be disturbing, inconvenient, unsettling, and even unwelcome to those in power – are undesirable. This chapter examines the ministerial adviser as a participant in the policymaking process and explores the challenges this “third element” poses for public servants as policymakers.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Askim, J., R. Karlsen, and K. Kolltveit. 2017. Political appointees in executive government: Exploring and explaining roles using a large-N survey in Norway. Public Administration 95 (2): 342–358.
Aucoin, P. 1990. Administrative reform in public management: Paradigms, principles, paradoxes, and pendulums. Governance 3 (2): 115–137.
———. 2012. New political governance in Westminster systems: Impartial public administration and management performance at risk. Governance 25 (2): 177–199.
Blais, A., and S. Dion, eds. 1991. The budget-maximising bureaucrat: Appraisals and evidence. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Blick, A. 2004. People who live in the dark: The history of the special adviser in British politics. London: Politico’s/Methuen.
Christiansen, P., and H. Salomonsen. 2018. Denmark: Loyalty and the political adviser bargain. In Ministers, minders and mandarins: An international study of relationships at the executive summit of parliamentary democracies, ed. R. Shaw and C. Eichbaum, 53–71. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Christiansen, P., B. Niklasson, and P. Öhberg. 2016. Does politics crowd out professional competence? The organisation of ministerial advice in Denmark and Sweden. West European Politics 39 (6): 1230–1250.
Connaughton, B. 2010. Glorified gofers, policy experts or good generalists: A classification of the roles of the Irish ministerial adviser. Irish Political Studies 25 (3): 347–369.
Craft, J. 2015. Conceptualizing the policy work of partisan advisers. Policy Sciences 48 (2): 135–158.
———. 2016. Backrooms and beyond: Partisan advisers and the politics of policy work in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Craft, J., and J. Halligan. 2016. Assessing 30 years of Westminster policy advisory system experience. Policy Sciences 50 (1): 47–162.
Dahlström, C. 2011. Who takes the hit? Ministerial advisers and the distribution of welfare state cuts. Journal of European Public Policy 18 (2): 294–310.
Dahlström, C., and B. Niklasson. 2013. The politics of politicization in Sweden. Public Administration 91 (4): 891–907.
Dahlström, C., B.G. Peters, and J. Pierre, eds. 2011. Steering from the centre: Political control in Western democracies. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
De Visscher, C., and H. Salomonsen. 2012. Explaining differences in ministerial menages a trois: Multiple bargains in Belgium and Denmark. International Review of Administrative Sciences 79 (1): 71–90.
Di Mascio, F., and A. Natalini. 2013. Analysing the role of ministerial cabinets in Italy: Legacy and temporality in the study of administrative reforms. International Review of Administrative Sciences 79 (2): 328–346.
Ebinger, F., S. Veit, and N. Fromm. 2019. The partisan–professional dichotomy revisited: Politicization and decision-making of senior civil servants. Public Administration 97 (4): 861–876. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12613.
Eichbaum, C., and R. Shaw. 2007. Ministerial advisers and the politics of policy-making: Bureaucratic permanence and popular control. Australian Journal of Public Administration 66 (4): 453–467.
———. 2008. Revisiting politicization: Political advisers and public servants in Westminster systems. Governance 21 (3): 337–363.
Halligan, J. 1995. Policy advice and the public sector. In Governance in a changing environment, ed. B.G. Peters and D. Savoie, 138–172. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Hamburger, P., B. Stephens, and P. Weller. 2012. A capacity for central coordination: The case of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Australian Journal of Public Administration 70 (4): 377–390.
Hay, C. 2004. The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the institutional embedding of neoliberalism. Economy and Society 33 (4): 500–527.
Heclo, H. 1975. OMB and the presidency: The problem of neutral competence. The Public Interest 38 (1): 80–98.
Hood, M., and M. Lodge. 2006. The politics of public service bargains. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hustedt, T., and H. Salomonsen. 2014. Ensuring political responsiveness: Politicization mechanisms in ministerial bureaucracies. International Review of Administrative Sciences 80 (4): 746–765.
———. 2018. From neutral competence to competent neutrality? Revisiting neutral competence as the core normative foundation of Western bureaucracy. In Bureaucracy and society in transition: Comparative perspectives, ed. H. Byrkjeflot and F. Engelstad, 69–88. Bingley: Emerald Publishing Ltd.
Hustedt, T., K. Kolltveit, and H. Salomonsen. 2017. Ministerial advisers in executive government: Out from the dark and into the limelight. Public Administration 95 (2): 299–311.
LSE GV314 Group. 2012. New life at the top: Special advisers in British government. British Journal of Parliamentary Affairs 65 (4): 715–732.
Maley, M. 2000. Conceptualising advisers’ policy work: The distinctive policy roles of ministerial advisers in the Keating government, 1991–1996. Australian Journal of Political Science 35 (3): 449–470.
Niklasson, B., and P. Öhberg. 2018. Sweden: Civil servants and political advisers as adversaries. In Ministers, minders and mandarins: An international study of relationships at the executive summit of parliamentary democracies, ed. R. Shaw and C. Eichbaum, 163–179. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Niskanen, W. 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
Öhberg, P., P. Christiansen, and B. Niklasson. 2017. Administrative politicization or contestability? How political advisers affect neutral competence in policy processes. Public Administration 95 (1): 269–285.
Pierre, J., and B.G. Peters. 2000. Governance, politics and the state. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
Rhodes, R.A.W. 2007. Understanding governance: Ten years on. Organization Studies 28 (8): 1243–1264.
Rourke, F. 1992. Responsiveness and neutral competence in American bureaucracy. Public Administration Review 52 (6): 539–546.
Shaw, R., and C. Eichbaum. 2018a. Introduction: Ministers, minders and mandarins. In Ministers, minders and mandarins: An international study of relationships at the executive summit of parliamentary democracies, ed. R. Shaw and C. Eichbaum, 1–14. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
———, eds. 2018b. Ministers, minders and mandarins: An international study of relationships at the executive summit of parliamentary democracies. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Shepherd, W. 1995. Contestability vs. competition: Once more. Land Economics 71 (3): 299–309.
Shergold, P. 2005. “The need to wield a crowbar”: Political will and public service. Adelaide: Dunstan Oration.
Silva, P. 2017. Political advisers in Portugal: Partisanship and loyalty in policy processes. Public Administration 95 (2): 378–392.
Van der Meer, F., and G. Dijkstra. 2017. Loyal contradiction within bureaucracy. Paper presented at the International Conference on Public Policy, Singapore, 28–30 June.
Walter, J. 2006. Ministers, minders and public servants: Changing parameters of responsibility in Australia. Australian Journal of Public Administration 65 (3): 22–27.
West, W. 2005. Neutral competence and political responsiveness: An uneasy relationship. Policy Studies Journal 33 (2): 147–160.
Wicks, N. 2003. Defining the boundaries within the executive: Ministers, special advisers and the permanent civil service. London: Committee on Standards in Public Life.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Section Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this entry
Cite this entry
Shaw, R. (2020). Ministerial Advisers, Contestability and Politicization in the Core Executive in Westminster Systems. In: Sullivan, H., Dickinson, H., Henderson, H. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of the Public Servant. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03008-7_10-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03008-7_10-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-03008-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-03008-7
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Political Science and International StudiesReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences