Abstract
It is a widely known fact among game theorists as well as political scientists that the distribution of voting weights in a voting body is generally a poor proxy for the distribution of voting power within the body. It has been proposed to equate the distribution of a priori voting power and actual seat distribution by randomizing the decision rule of the voting body over various majority rules. In this paper, some implications of this procedure will be discussed.
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Holler, M.J. Strict proportional power in voting bodies. Theor Decis 19, 249–258 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126416
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126416