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Paradoxes of Rational Choice Theory

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Handbook of Risk Theory

Abstract

Rational choice theory (RCT) is beset with paradoxes. Why, then, bother with a theory that raises numerous counterexamples, contradictions, and a seemingly endless stream of mutually conflicting remedies? In contrast to this impression, I argue in this chapter that RCT paradoxes play much more productive roles. Eight paradoxes are described in detail, some of their proposed solutions are sketched out, and they are classified according to the kind of paradox they pose. At their example I argue that RCT paradoxes, rather than providing evidence for straightforward rejections of the theory, play important roles in education and in normative research.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 4, Helsinki, 14, Finland

    Dr. Till Grüne-Yanoff

Authors
  1. Dr. Till Grüne-Yanoff
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Correspondence to Till Grüne-Yanoff .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

    Sabine Roeser

  2. Philosophy Department, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Sabine Roeser

  3. Human Technology Center, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Rafaela Hillerbrand

  4. Department of Plant Physiology and Forest Genetics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden

    Per Sandin

  5. Section for Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Martin Peterson

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Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2012). Paradoxes of Rational Choice Theory. In: Roeser, S., Hillerbrand, R., Sandin, P., Peterson, M. (eds) Handbook of Risk Theory. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-007-1432-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-007-1433-5

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