1. An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem

   • Edi Karni
   • John A. Weymark

   Article Pages: 321 - 332

2. Voting paradoxes and referenda

   • Hannu Nurmi

   Article Pages: 333 - 350

3. The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules

   • William V. Gehrlein

   Article Pages: 351 - 358

4. The structure of fuzzy preferences: Social choice implications

   • Gregory Richardson

   Article Pages: 359 - 369

5. Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty

   • Nicolas Gravel

   Article Pages: 371 - 382

6. Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions

   • Peter Sudhölter
   • Bezalel Peleg

   Article Pages: 383 - 411

7. Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

   • Marco Mariotti

   Article Pages: 413 - 421

8. Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering

   • Michel Regenwetter
   • Bernard Grofman

   Article Pages: 423 - 443

9. Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions

   • Anke Gerber
   • Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin

   Article Pages: 445 - 454

10. Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

    • Peter Fristrup
    • Hans Keiding

    Article Pages: 455 - 467