1. Editorial introduction

   EditorialNotes Pages: 3 - 3

2. Allan Birnbaum's conception of statistical evidence

   • Ronald N. Giere

   OriginalPaper Pages: 5 - 13

3. Publications by Allan Birnbaum

   • Ronald N. Giere

   Legacy Pages: 15 - 17

4. The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-savage argument for Bayesian theory

   • Allan Birnbaum

   OriginalPaper Pages: 19 - 49

5. The distinction between inference and decision

   • D. V. Lindley

   OriginalPaper Pages: 51 - 58

6. Decisions as statistical evidence and Birnbaum's ‘confidence concept’

   • John W. Pratt

   OriginalPaper Pages: 59 - 69

7. The analogy between decision and inference

   • Cedric A. B. Smith

   OriginalPaper Pages: 71 - 85

8. Decisions, conclusions, and utilities

   • Henry E. Kyburg Jr.

   OriginalPaper Pages: 87 - 96

9. Frequentist probability and frequentist statistics

   • J. Neyman

   OriginalPaper Pages: 97 - 131

10. A note on metastatistics or ‘an essay toward stating a problem in the doctrine of chances’

    • Lucien Lecam

    OriginalPaper Pages: 133 - 160

11. The foundations of statistics—Are there any?

    • J. Kiefer

    OriginalPaper Pages: 161 - 176

12. Errata

    Erratum Pages: 177 - 177