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Awareness of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks' Dangers: Role of Internet Pricing Mechanisms

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Abstract

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks consist of overwhelming a server, a network or a Web site in order to paralyze its normal activity. The additional parameter in Distributed Denial of Service (DdoS) attacks is the distributing strategy. It means that DDoS attacks do not come from a single computer but stem from all accessible channels and servers. Consequences are multiple, ranging from system errors, temporary inability to access the Web site for normal users to challenging the actual reliability of the Internet. Despite this, Internet users show carelessness. The explanation lies in the specificities of DDoS attacks. We explore possibilities to raise users' awareness about the actual amplitude of problems caused by DDoS attacks. We suggest a careful examination of Internet pricing mechanisms and switching from flat to usage-constraining pricing schemes.

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Lejeune, M.A. Awareness of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks' Dangers: Role of Internet Pricing Mechanisms. NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking 4, 145–162 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021258103204

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