Abstract
Evidence is drawn together to connect sources of inconsistency that Frege discerned in his foundations for arithmetic with the origins of the paradox derived by Russell in Basic Laws I and then with antinomies, paradoxes, contradictions, riddles associated with modal and intensional logics. Examined are: Frege's efforts to grasp logical objects; the philosophical arguments that compelled Russell to adopt a description theory of names and a eliminative theory of descriptions; the resurfacing of issues surrounding reference, descriptions, identity, substitutivity, paradox in the debates concerning modal and intensional logics; the development of the New Theory of Reference. I consider this to be the philosophical ground upon which the debates regarding that theory should take place.
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Ortiz Hill, C. Reference and Paradox. Synthese 138, 207–232 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000013241.59493.1d
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000013241.59493.1d