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Was Napoleon a Benevolent Dictator? An Economic Justification for Codification

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Abstract

Legal history has seen important codifications, among others the Code Napoleon of 1804. These are usually justified by the search for legal harmonisation and coordination. We refine the argument by claiming that a legal rule can be understood as a standard with network externalities. In that view, codification may be analysed as a means to internalise adoption externalities when the market is characterised by legal inertia or instability, in particular when agents adopt opportunistic and free riding behaviours. We also argue that codification should not be systematically opposed to market coordination but may on the contrary provide a useful complement to the market process so as to achieve an equilibrium in the legal market. We then provide a few illustrations and discuss the behaviour of the codification authorities.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratoire CERAS, OMI-EDJ (Economie-Droit-Justice), Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne, 57bis, rue Pierre Taittinger, F-51096, Reims cedex

    Sophie Harnay

  2. Laboratoire d'Economie Publique (LAEP), Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112, Bd de l'Hôpital, F-75647, Paris cedex 13, France

    Sophie Harnay

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Harnay, S. Was Napoleon a Benevolent Dictator? An Economic Justification for Codification. European Journal of Law and Economics 14, 237–251 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020785001266

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