Abstract
A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are drawn. An axiomatization of AU-quantifiers and a model theory for them is given, and an appendix contains a completeness proof.
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Azzouni, J. Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30, 329–354 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017515608543
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017515608543