Abstract
In this paper, inspired by the late twentieth century developments in philosophy of science (ontic structural realism), I propose an ontological scheme to accommodate the scientifically-informed anti-substantivalist views of the self. I call the position structural realist theory of the self (SRS for short). More specifically, I argue that SRS provides a middle ground for bringing a metaphysical reconciliation between the two recurring, and apparently competing forms of such anti-substantivalist views, i.e., eliminativism and pluralism. The notion of the structural self, as the underpinning pattern that is the subject of the ontological commitments in SRS, is not as cumbersome as the orthodox substantivalist notion, and yet accounts for the relation of the different aspects and elements of the self by integrating them structurally into a central unifying pattern of selfhood. I use the experimental studies of Northoff et al. (Neuroimage 31:440–457, 2006) about the processing of the self-related stimuli in the cortical midline structure of the brain, to argue that the underlying pattern of the selfhood could be sought at the level of information processing (in the sense of generic computation). I also add a programmatic suggestion about how the different situated, experiential and extended aspects of the selfhood could be structurally incorporated into this underlying pattern.
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Notes
I am indebted to the reviewer #2 for seeing the debate in this light.
The phenomenal experiences of substantiality, of having an essence and of individuality (i.e., of being an entity that is unique and cannot be divided), are special forms of conscious representational content (2003a, 563–564). Metzinger, however, explains (away) conscious representational content of the feeling of self-awareness in terms of the dynamical interplay between the self-model and the world-model (2003a, Chap. 6). This elementary confusion makes any system acting under a transparent self-model to experience itself as being in direct and immediate contact with itself (2003a, p. 337).
Pluralism with regard to mind and its cognitive faculties has its advocates. It holds that there is no comprehensive meta-framework to unify the heterogeneity of different empirical and theoretical research programs in the field of cognitive science (see Dale et al. 2009, p. 740). The universe and its representation in our scientific theories are based on epistemological heterogeneity, rather than theoretical homogeneity (ibid). The view could be very useful for launching epistemic and ontic programs against reductionism. However, as I remarked in my assessment of the pattern theory, pluralism and providing an account of the relation between different elements of the self don’t mesh together nicely.
Here, I rely on Hempel’s proposal: “What scientific explanation, especially theoretical explanation, aims at is not intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but an objective kind of insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the phenomena as manifestations of common, underlying structures and processes that conform to specific, testable, basic principles” (Hempel 1966, p. 83).
“Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously should be motivated by, and only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two or more specific scientific hypotheses jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses taken separately, where a ‘scientific hypothesis’ is understood as an hypothesis that is taken seriously by institutionally bona fide current science” (Ross et al. 2007, p. 30).
The progressive research programs that aim to investigate the appropriate computational methods of modelling the different self-related phenomena confirm this claim. For example, Thagard and Aubie (2008) proposed a neuro-computational framework for modelling the interaction of the cognitive appraisals and somatic perceptions which arguably produce the qualitative emotional experience, and Hutcherson et al. (2015) explore the neural-informational mechanisms of social phenomena such as the altruistic choices. This suggest that the social and emotional aspects of the self could be incorporated into a neat information-theoretic framework. There are experimental grounds for believing in the unifying power of this formal framework.
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Acknowledgments
I am greatly indebted to Richard Creath and Steve Elliott. It was not possible to come to the final version without their contribution. I have to thank the two anonymous referees of Synthese for their useful comments and remarks. I am also grateful to Steven French and Hasan Khodawerdian. All of these debts are gratefully acknowledged.
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Beni, M.D. Structural realist account of the self. Synthese 193, 3727–3740 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1098-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1098-9