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Aristotelian essentialism: essence in the age of evolution

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Abstract

The advent of contemporary evolutionary theory ushered in the eventual decline of the theory of Aristotelian Essentialism (Æ)—for it is widely assumed that essence does not, and cannot have any proper place in the age of evolution. This paper argues that this assumption is a mistake: if Æ can be suitably evolved, it need not face extinction. In it, I claim that if that theory’s fundamental ontology consists of dispositional properties, and if its characteristic metaphysical machinery is interpreted within the framework of contemporary evolutionary developmental biology, an evolved essentialism is available. The reformulated theory of Æ offered in this paper not only fails to fall prey to the typical collection of criticisms, but is also independently both theoretically and empirically plausible. The paper contends that, properly understood, essence belongs in the age of evolution.

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Notes

  1. I borrow this colourful phrasing from Hacking (2007).

  2. Cf. Wilkins (2013), Devitt (2008).

  3. As Elder (2008, p. 345) notes: “If a plurality of organisms is to populate a genuine natural kind...more is needed than just that the same phenotypic traits crop up in member after member of the plurality. The same traits must recur across all the organisms for a common reason”.

  4. Cf. Lennox (2001), Pellegrin (1987), and Balme (1987).

  5. Griffiths (2002, p. 77).

  6. Cf. Okasha (2002, p. 191).

  7. This lack of evidence has arguably led to the formulation of the ‘Homeostatic Property Cluster’ view of natural kinds—see Boyd (1999), Wilson (1999), and Wilson et al. (2007).

  8. See also Griffiths (2002), Hull (1999), and Sober (1980).

  9. Cf. Wilson (1999, p. 190), and Okasha (2002, p. 197).

  10. For a general overview, see Whitman and Agrawal (2009) and Schlichting and Smith (2002).

  11. See Fusco and Minelli (2010) and West-Eberhard (2003).

  12. Dispositions are often contrasted with ‘categorical’ properties—those whose nature must be imbued with causality from higher-order laws of nature, or else some flotilla of possible worlds. For discussions of the distinction, see Ellis (2010), Oderberg (2009), and Cross (2005).

  13. Even the seemingly simple philosopher’s paragon of dispositionality—‘fragility’—is realised (in most cases) by a complex physical microstructure, and ‘breaking’ is in fact a complex, multi-stage process featuring the aligning of various micro-events that represent decreasing degrees of structural integrity.

  14. That dispositional properties are responsible for establishing this type of causal connection between two states is the basis for their ubiquitous assignment as truthmakers for subjunctive conditionals (especially counterfactuals). However, spelling out precisely what the truthmaking role is, and showing that dispositional properties play it with respect to those conditionals turns out to be exceptionally tricky. As it happens, I won’t be making use of that concept here, as I’ve no need for it. For a good discussion of the related issues, see Austin (2015b) and Eagle (2009).

  15. I’ve said “reliably and repeatedly” purposely here, as dispositional properties do not necessitate their manifestations—a fact ensured by the possibility of so-called ‘masks’, properties or processes which interrupt the causal activity of dispositional properties. See Eagle (2009), Schrenk (2010), and Mumford and Anjum (2011) for good discussions of the issue.

  16. In the dispositions literature, this fact is often referred to as dispositions being “multi-track”. See Martin (2008), Manley and Wasserman (2008), Jacobs (2011), and Vetter (2013) for fuller discussions.

  17. This is a species of the relation that Lewis (2000, p. 190) called ‘causal influence’ which forms the conceptual bedrock of Woodward’s (2003; 2010) influential theory of causation.

  18. Of course, not all dispositions are strongly goal-directed in this sense, but the ones which will concern us here—namely, those that populate the biological realm—certainly are.

  19. Nagel (1977, p. 272).

  20. See Walsh (2012), and Mayr (1992).

  21. Indeed, as many have now argued, ‘modularity’ may very well be a necessary requisite for the process of evolution: we may need variability to occur within discrete elements which doesn’t affect other elements if organisms are going to survive mutations and be subsequently subject to selection pressures. See Lewontin (1978) and Altenberg (1995).

  22. Müller (2008, p. 10).

  23. See Winther (2001), Bolker (2000), and Dassow and Munro (1999).

  24. This technique was especially prominent in Halder et al. (1995); For a general contemporary review in a particular case, see Ashery-Padan and Gruss (2001). And for an analysis of the expression patterns of modules in particular, see Raff and Sly (2000).

  25. See Wagner and Altenberg (1996).

  26. See Edelman and Gally (2001), Dassow et al. (2000), and Whitacre and Bender (2010).

  27. This is discussed with particular examples in Müller and Newman (1999), and Müller (2003).

  28. See Salazar-Ciudad and Jernvall (2013) for the concept of ‘causality horizons’ in explanations of developmental morphology.

  29. Though this general application has been made—in Wagner (2000) and Eble (2005)—, it has only been very briefly stated, and not explored in any depth.

  30. It’s plausible that there are at least four distinct “levels” of morphological organisation—see Rasskin-Gutman (2003).

  31. Thus, in the context of dynamical systems theory, the morphological structures associated with these modules are often characterised as ‘attractor-states’ which shape the “valleys” of an organisms’ epigenetic landscape, resulting in many distinct developmental pathways leading to the same end-state. See Jaeger and Monk (2014), and Striedter (1998).

  32. See Amundson (2005) for an excellent in-depth discussion of the ‘structuralist’ paradigm and its relation to that of the Modern Synthesis.

  33. Cf. Müller (2008).

  34. See West-Eberhard (2003), and Pigliucci (2001).

  35. For more on the concept of the ‘developmental hourglass’, see Galis and Metz (2001) and Kalinka et al. (2010).

  36. See Mann and Carroll (2002), Gurdon and Bourillot (2001), and Tabata (2001).

  37. See Schlichting and Smith (2002), and Aubin-Horth and Renn (2009).

  38. See Shubin et al. (2009), and Wagner (2007).

  39. Wagner (2014, pp. 92–93) argues that ‘character-identity’ determination (a) cannot be specified by positional information, given that they are variable in and among instances, and that it likewise (b) cannot be specified by downstream target genes, given not only their similar variability, but also their regulatory dependence upon upstream modules.

  40. Cf. Newman and Muller (2006), and Newman et al. (2006). For the concept of ‘morphospace’ generally, see Rasskin-Gutman (2005), and McGhee (2006).

  41. Müller (2008, p. 19).

  42. Accordingly, given our knowledge of the existence of highly conserved developmental mechanisms—such as “toolkit” genes, discussed earlier—every natural kind will share a significant proportion of their essential properties, these being ontological traces of their evolutionary origins.

  43. Davila-Velderrain et al. (2015), Huang (2012), Wang et al. (2011).

  44. For a defence of the ‘prime mover’ aspect of this claim, see Austin (2015a).

  45. Verd et al. (2014), Bhattacharya et al. (2011).

  46. Wagner (2014), Deutsch (2005).

  47. In fact, it’s for this very reason that Wagner (2014, p. 20) refers to his modelling of developmental modules as a theory of ‘variational structuralism’.

  48. According to this conception of the Aristotelian ‘natural state’, if we want to carve the world into proper natural kinds, it won’t be enough to group together organisms which share exact morphologies—rather, as evo-devo has taught us, we must look conceptually underneath those morphologies.

  49. If, as Rosenberg (2001) argues, the process of natural selection operates on function, and is rather “blind” to structure, we shouldn’t expect the essence of a natural kind, being so central to the process of ontogenic development, to be necessarily tied-up to a particular material realisation base.

  50. Jaeger and Monk (2014), Dupre (2013), Rosa and Etxeberria (2011), Gilbert and Bolker (2001).

  51. Most notably by Walsh (2006) and Boulter (2012), and to a lesser degree Devitt (2008).

  52. In the context of evo-devo, these sorts of studies may already be taking place. With respect to (a), investigating the effect of regulatory novelties on homology-generating pathways via mutation or epigenetic marking may be a viable way of discerning the arrival of novel phenomodulatory dispositions: see Wagner (2014), and Webster and Goodwin (2006). With respect to (b), the method of distinguishing two homologous modules in virtue of their non-overlapping sets of morphospace ‘character states’ may constitute an empirical method of detecting the presence of distinct phenomodulatory dispositions: see Wagner’s (2014) discussion of representing the ‘variational modalities’ of homologous structures.

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I am grateful for the generous support of the Analysis Trust.

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    Christopher J. Austin

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Austin, C.J. Aristotelian essentialism: essence in the age of evolution. Synthese 194, 2539–2556 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1066-4

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