Abstract
I consider the idea of a structure of fundamental physical particles (as described, for example, in quantum theory) being causal. Causation is traditionally thought of as involving relations between entities—objects or events—that cause and are affected. On structuralist interpretations, however, it is unclear whether or how precisely fundamental particles can be causally efficacious. On some interpretations, only relations (as opposed to entities) exist; on others, particles are ontologically dependent on their relations in ways that problematize the traditional picture. I argue that thinking about causal efficacy in this context generates an inevitable pattern of reasoning. To assess the cogency of a given structuralist proposal one must take a stand with respect to a significant metaphysical challenge. Two options then emerge: skepticism about the form of structuralism at issue; or a dissolution of the challenge by means of a contentious ontological primitive. I contend that the choice between these options cannot be forced on scientific or philosophical grounds alone.
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Notes
For a discussion and defense of some reasoned preferences regarding causation, see Chakravartty (2007, Chap. 4).
See Ladyman (2014/2007) for a comprehensive accounting of the positions on offer. I will assume for the sake of argument in what follows that eliminative and non-eliminative structuralism are, in fact, distinct options. For an argument to the effect that insofar as non-eliminative positions ascribe only extrinsic properties to particles, they inevitably collapse into eliminativism, see Chakravartty (2012).
Esfeld and Lam (2011) suggest a twist on the second variant: that the distinction between particles and their relations should be understood as merely conceptual rather than in terms of ontological dependence. It is unclear to me that this describes a form of structuralism as such.
Thus, the lively debate surrounding the question of whether particles are relationally discernible as individuals (for an overview, see Caulton 2013) is largely irrelevant to the present discussion. Cf. Wolff (2012, p. 614) on the singlet state of two electrons: ‘The question is not so much whether electrons are individuals, but whether they are reducible to the role they play.’ More generally, most theorizing about causation is unconcerned with the question of whether the relata of causal relations are individuals or not.
For a provenance of earlier forms taken by these arguments (offered by many including myself and Psillos 2006), Ladyman (2014/2007) is a helpful resource. The intended novelty of what follows is not so much in these arguments as in the meta-philosophical diagnosis of them presented. It is also worth noting that variations of these arguments can be formulated independently of the subject of causation, though the assignment of this issue of the journal—to consider whether structuralism is compatible with causation—does yield an especially pressing formulation of them.
There is a long tradition of concerns about circularity that have a family resemblance, from worries in early analytic philosophy about the coherence of internal relations, to worries about forms of functionalism in the philosophy of mind, to worries about dispositional accounts of properties. Lam 2014 (p. 1163) suggests that some worries about circularity in the present context are ‘mere prejudice’, but I take the one I describe here to be substantive.
By ‘qualitative’ here I mean to distinguish these properties from primitive principles of individual identity such as haecceities or primitive this-ness. The former commonly feature in descriptions of the kind identities of entities, whereas the latter (cannot and thus) do not.
This raises concern about Dorato and Morganti’s (2013, p. 592) view that fine-grained ontology can be ‘straightforwardly extracted from the relevant scientific description’. I share their pluralistic inclinations towards such ontology, as may be appropriate across different domains, but agree with Arenhart and Krause’s (2014) diagnosis that “extractions” inevitably make recourse to extra-scientific, metaphysical assumptions.
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Acknowledgments
For comments and discussions relating to aspects of this material I am grateful to Michael Esfeld, Steven French, Johanna Wolff, and terrific audiences at Case Western, Northern Illinois, Oxford, Pretoria, California–San Diego, and Western Ontario, as well as at meetings of the Eastern APA (Atlanta) and the International Ontology Congress (San Sebastián).
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Chakravartty, A. Particles, causation, and the metaphysics of structure. Synthese 194, 2273–2289 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0913-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0913-z