Abstract
This is an essay on G. E. Moore’s argument in defense of common sense against David Hume’s theory. However, the burden of essay is to show that, though Moore derived has argument from Thomas Reid, it was the latter who noted that the defense of common sense required more than showing that Hume’s theory conflicted with common sense. It required supplying a better theory than that of Hume’s of the operations of the human mind, and especially, a better theory of the evidence and justification of common sense beliefs. The essay is a formulation and defense of Reid’s theory of conception, conviction and evidence.
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It is with great pleasure that I contribute the essay that follows to a volume to honor my esteemed friend and colleague, Pascal Engel. Whatever the merits of the current essay, it was provoked by Pascal when he invited me to contribute a lecture on common sense to a conference in Geneva. Having presented a lecture, I thought no more of what use to make of it until the invitation to contribute to this volume arrived. Then I thought, whatever the merits or lack thereof, it was my good friend Pascal who was responsible for the lecture coming into existence. So here are my thoughts in the form of a revised lecture on common sense for a philosopher of admirable philosophical sense that is not at all common.
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Keith, L. Common sense and skepticism: a lecture. Synthese 194, 1503–1516 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0770-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0770-9