Abstract
Although explanation is a central topic in the philosophy of science, there is an important issue concerning explanation that has not been discussed much, namely, why some phenomena need an explanation while some do not. In this paper we first explain why this is an important issue, and then discuss two accounts of the need for explanation that can be gathered from the literature. We argue that both accounts are inadequate. The main purpose of the paper is, however, to offer a normative account of the need for explanation. On this account, a demand for explanation is possible only against the background of a certain understanding of the world (call it a ‘map’). It is the map we are using that provides us with the concepts and beliefs in terms of which we can ask for an explanation. And a phenomenon needs explanation only when it does not fit the map—the phenomenon’s not fitting the map is a good reason for us to look for an explanation of it. This account not only captures our pre-theoretical understanding of the need for explanation, but also is in accordance with our practice of demanding an explanation.
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Notes
Following Hempel, we use the term ‘phenomenon’ to refer to the explanandum. See Hempel (1965, p. 247).
To avoid clumsiness, from now on we will use ‘puzzled by’ to mean ‘puzzled by or curious about’ and use ‘puzzlement’ to refer to both puzzlement and curiosity.
Sometimes we don’t ask for an explanation merely because we believe, rightly or wrongly, that we know why it happened.
For a clear exposition of the distinction between directives and evaluatives, see Thomson (2008). As Thomson points out, many philosophers “think that what makes directives true, when they are, is facts about reasons for action” (p. 125); we agree with these philosophers. Thomson argues, however, that “directives do not rest on reasons for action, rather reasons for action rest on directives” (p. 126).
For simplicity, we will be using the word ‘surprising’ instead of the phrase ‘surprising or unexpected’.
We say “typically”, because the lottery could have been rigged, or the winner may not have known that a ticket was bought for her, and so on.
Chanciness is not necessarily the same as randomness. Here is a way of making the distinction: randomness is a feature of a sequence of events, while chanciness is a feature of the process by which an event is caused or brought about. Randomness is roughly a measure of disorderedness, so we could produce a random sequence even with a non-chancy process by, for example choosing the 3156th through 3163rd digits of pi. Conversely, repeated chance processes could (by chance) turn up a non-random sequence. If we flip a coin ten times in a row and it lands heads each time, the sequence is not random, although it was produced by chance. See Eagle (2012).
We are not the first to use the map analogy in the philosophy of science. Toulmin (1953), for example, discusses at great length “the analogy between physical theories and maps”, which he thinks “can be used to illuminate some dark and dusty corners in the philosophy of science” (p. 105). A more recent example is Kitcher (2001), which uses the history of map-making to illustrate the notion of accuracy and whether there can be a single ideal theory (see Chap. 5).
This example is loosely drawn from a story about the work of Klaus Zuberbühler as reported on the Radiolab program “Wild Talk”. It has been tailored for narrative purposes, and is not necessarily an accurate description of phenomena of the Taï Forest.
In (ii) and (iii), as in (i), P is either incompatible with the rest of M or highly unlikely given the rest of M. It should be noted that it is not clear how unlikely P has to be for it to not fit M. This is not a problem for our account because it implies only that there are cases in which it is not clear whether the phenomenon needs explanation. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the difference between P’s being incompatible with the rest of M and P’s being highly unlikely given the rest of M.
Or equally likely, if one insists on describing the initial state in terms of the microscopic description and the systems evolve deterministically. For the sake of argument let us assume that under the microscopic descriptions both final states are highly unlikely. The example does not, of course, suggest that it is as likely that the water will freeze as that it will stay liquid if the temperature in the room does not change—we are speaking only of the two final states under the microscopic description.
We can, however, imagine that Winfred himself does not think his winning three times in a row requires explanation if we imagine that he is using a map very different from ours: his map includes reliable fortune-telling as part of reality and includes details of how certain fortune-telling objects, such as fortune cookies, work. And the reason why Winfred does not think his winning needs explanation is simply that he believes there is already an explanation—the fortune cookies had correctly predicted that he would win.
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for urging us to clarify the difference between the map analogy and the web analogy.
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
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Wong, Wh., Yudell, Z. A normative account of the need for explanation. Synthese 192, 2863–2885 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0690-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0690-8