Abstract
I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called ‘Law of Likelihood’ is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.
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Chandler, J. Contrastive confirmation: some competing accounts. Synthese 190, 129–138 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9845-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9845-9