Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Indexicality, intensionality, and relativist post-semantics

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This essay argues that relativist semantics provide fruitful frameworks for the study of the relationships between meaning and truth-conditions, and consequently for the analysis of the logical properties of expressions. After a discussion of the role of intensionality and indexicality within classic double-indexed semantics, I explain that the non-relativistic identification of the parameters needed for the definition of truth and for the interpretation of indexicals is grounded on considerations that are irrelevant for the assessment of the relationships between meaning and truth.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Brogaard B. (2008) Sea battle semantics. Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 326–335

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Castaneda H. (1957) Some nonformal ‘logical’ relations. Philosophical Studies 8: 89–92

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Egan A., Hawthorne J., Weatherson B. (2005) Epistemic modals in context. In: Preyer G., Peter G. (eds) Contextualism in philosophy, knowledge, meaning, and truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan D. (1977) Demonstratives. In: Almog J., Perry J., Wettstein H. (eds) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Kölbel M. (2002) Truth without objectivity. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1963). Semantical considerations on modal logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16, 83–94. (Reprinted from Reference and modality, pp. 63–72, by L. Linsky, Ed., 1971, Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  • Lewis, D. (1980). Index, context, and content. In S. Kanger & S. Öhman (Eds.), Philosophy and grammar. Dordrecht: Reidel. (Reprinted from Papers in philosophical logic, by D. Lewis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

  • MacFarlane J. (2003) Future contingents and relative truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53: 321–336

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacFarlane J. (2008) Truth in the garden of forking paths. In: Kölbel M., García-Carpintero M. (eds) Relative truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 81–102

    Google Scholar 

  • MacFarlane J. (2009) Nonindexical contextualism. Synthese 166(2): 231–250

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • MacFarlane, J. (2002a). Three grades of truth relativity. Manuscript.

  • MacFarlane, J. (2002b). Valuations without supervaluations. Manuscript.

  • Predelli S., Stojanovic I. (2008) Semantic relativism and the logic of indexicals. In: Kölbel M., García-Carpintero M. (eds) Relative truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 63–79

    Google Scholar 

  • Stojanovic, I. (2007). Talking about taste: disagreement, implicit arguments, and relative truth. Linguistics and Philosophy, 30(6).

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK

    Stefano Predelli

Authors
  1. Stefano Predelli
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Stefano Predelli.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Predelli, S. Indexicality, intensionality, and relativist post-semantics. Synthese 184, 121–136 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9728-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9728-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation