Abstract
The best defense of the doctrine of the Incarnation implies that traditional Christianity has a special stake in the knowability paradox, a stake not shared by other theistic perspectives or by non-traditional accounts of the Incarnation. Perhaps, this stake is not even shared by antirealism, the view most obviously threatened by the paradox. I argue for these points, concluding that these results put traditional Christianity at a disadvantage compared to other viewpoints, and I close with some comments about the extent of the burden incurred.
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Kvanvig, J. The incarnation and the knowability paradox. Synthese 173, 89–105 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9678-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9678-6