Abstract
I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. This whole approach is further supported by a brief exposition of some recent work in cognitive, or usage-based, linguistics. Finally, with all the above as background, I criticize the recently much discussed idea that claims involving scientific models are really fictions.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Cartwright N.D. (1999) The dappled world: A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Chakravartty, A. (2009). Informational versus functional theories of scientific representation. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9502-3.
Contessa, G. (2009). Scientific models as fictional objects. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9503-2.
Dennett D.C. (1995) Darwin’s dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. Simon & Schuster, Inc, New York
Fine A. (1993) Fictionalism. Midwest studies in philosophy 18: 1–18
Giere R.N. (1988) Explaining science: A cognitive approach. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Giere R.N. (1994) The cognitive structure of scientific theories. Philosophy of Science 61: 276–296
Giere, R. N. (1999). Science without laws. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Giere R.N. (2006) Scientific perspectivism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Grice H.P. (1969) Utterer’s meaning and intentions. Philosophical Review 66: 377–388
Lakoff G. (1987) Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Morgan M.S., Morrison M. (eds) (1999) Models as mediators: Perspectives on natural and social science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Popper K.R. (1978) Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Dialectia 32: 339–355
Scheffler I. (1963) The anatomy of inquiry: Philosophical studies in the theory of science. Knopf, New York
Smith E.E., Medin D.L. (1981) Categories and concepts. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Suárez M. (2003) Scientific representation: Against similarity and isomorphism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17: 225–244
Suárez M. (2004) An inferential conception of scientific representation, Philosophy of Science 71: 767–779
Suárez M. (Eds.) (2009) Fictions in science: Philosophical essays on modeling and idealization. Routledge, London
Suppes P. (1969) Studies in the methodology and foundations of science: Selected papers from 1951 to 1969. Reidel, Dordrecht
Teller, P. (2008a). Of course idealizations are incommensurable! In L. Soler, H. Sankey, & P. Hoyningen-Huene (Eds.), Rethinking scientific change and theory comparison: Stabilities, ruptures, incommensurabilities? Kluwer.
Teller, P. (2008b). Representation in science. In S. Psillos & M. Curd (Eds.), The Routledge companion to the philosophy of science. London: Routledge.
Thomson-Jones, M. (2009). Missing systems and the face value practice. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9507-y.
Tomasello M. (2003) Constructing a language: A usage-based theory of language acquisition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
Vaihinger, H. (1935). The philosophy of ‘As If’: A system of the theoretical, practical and religious fictions of mankind (C. K. Ogden, Trans.). New York: Barnes & Noble.
van Frassen, B. C. (2000). The theory of tragedy and of science: Does nature have a narrative structure. In Sfendoni-Mendou (eds), Aristotle and contemporary science (Vol. 1). New York: Peter Lang.
Walton K.L. (1990) Mimesis as make-believe: On the foundations of the representational arts. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Giere, R.N. An agent-based conception of models and scientific representation. Synthese 172, 269 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9506-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9506-z