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How (not) to think about idealisation and ceteris paribus-laws

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Abstract

Semantic dispositionalism is the theory that a speaker’s meaning something by a given linguistic symbol is determined by her dispositions to use the symbol in a certain way. According to an objection by Kripke, further elaborated in Kusch (Analysis 65(2):156–163, 2005), semantic dispositionalism involves ceteris paribus-clauses and idealisations, such as unbounded memory, that deviate from standard scientific methodology. I argue that Kusch misrepresents both ceteris paribus-laws and idealisation, neither of which factually approximate the behaviour of agents or the course of events, but, rather, identify and isolate nature’s component parts and processes. An analysis of current results in cognitive psychology vindicates the idealisations involved and certain counterfactual assumptions in science generally. In particular, results suggest that there can be causal continuity between the dispositional structure of actual objects and that of highly idealised objects. I conclude by suggesting that we can assimilate ceteris paribus-laws with disposition ascriptions insofar as they involve identical idealising assumptions.

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  1. The Open University, Konstanz, Germany

    Robert Kowalenko

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  1. Robert Kowalenko
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Correspondence to Robert Kowalenko.

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Kowalenko, R. How (not) to think about idealisation and ceteris paribus-laws. Synthese 167, 183–201 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9310-1

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