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Whence avidity? Hume’s psychology and the origins of justice

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Abstract

Hume’s account of the roots of justice focuses on the need to secure possession against the corrosive effects of unrestrained avidity. The reasons for this focus lie deep in his understanding of human psychology, especially, the mimetic passions shaped by the principles of sympathy, social referencing, and reversal comparison. The need for esteem drives human beings to attach their pride to those things they think are especially valued by those whom they especially admire. Most predominant among these goods are riches and possessions. Intense competition for these scarce goods puts the material and psychological survival of all in jeopardy. Conventions of justice are needed to civilize and channel avidity, transforming it from open and deadly violence and secret envy and malice into productive and public emulation.

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Correspondence to Gerald J. Postema.

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Postema, G.J. Whence avidity? Hume’s psychology and the origins of justice. Synthese 152, 371–391 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9004-5

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