Abstract
Typical Gettieresque scenarios involve a subject, S, using a method, M, of believing something, p, where, normally, M is a reliable indicator of the truth of p, yet, in S’s circumstances, M is not reliable: M is deleteriously rigged. A different sort of scenario involves rigging that restores the reliability of a method M that is deleteriously rigged: M is restoratively rigged. Some theorists criticize (among others) the safe indication account of knowledge defended by Luper, Sosa, and Williamson on the grounds that it treats such cases as knowledge. But other theorists also criticize the safe indication account because it treats the cases as examples of ignorance when they are really examples of knowledge. I answer both groups of critics by arguing that (1) restorative rigging can enable us to know things, and (2) restoratively rigged cases can meet the relevant conditions of the safe indication account.
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Luper, S. Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account. Synthese 153, 161–170 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-6399-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-6399-3