Abstract
In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about objectidentity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal.
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Marcus, E. Events, Sortals, and the Mind–Body Problem. Synthese 150, 99–129 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6258-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6258-7