Abstract
This essay examines the relation between causation and causal explanation. It distinguishes two prominent roles that causes play within the sciences. On the one hand, causes may work as metaphysical posits. From this standpoint, mainstream in contemporary philosophy, causation provides the ‘raw material’ for explanation. On the other hand, causes may be conceived as explanatory postulates, theoretical hypotheses lacking any substantial ontological commitment. This unduly neglected distinction provides the conceptual resources to revisit longstanding philosophical issues, such as overdetermination and causal pluralism. It also inspires a provocative reframing of Russell’s famous, if notoriously elusive, remarks on the nature of causation.
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Acknowledgements
The author would like to express deep gratitude to Bill Anderson, Andrea Borghini, Mika Smith, and two anonymous referees for constructive comments on various drafts of this essay. Earlier drafts were presented at the 2013 APA Meeting in San Francisco, at UNED in Madrid, and at the 2018 Philosophy of Science Association meeting in Seattle. All audiences provided valuable feedback.
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Nathan, M.J. Causation vs. Causal Explanation: Which Is More Fundamental?. Found Sci 28, 441–454 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09672-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09672-2