Abstract
This paper analyses the optimal division of environmental policymaking functions among the different levels of government. Using fiscal federalism theory, we identify the most appropriate level of decentralization in each case. The paper focuses on water resources policies, with an application to Spanish regions during the 1996–2001 period. A simulation allows the implementation of more efficient policies in the context of water resources. The results of the empirical exercise show that a decentralized scenario is preferred under strong differences among preferences.
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Garcia-Valiñas, M.A. What level of decentralization is better in an environmental context? An application to water policies. Environ Resource Econ 38, 213–229 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-006-9071-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-006-9071-6