Abstract
The Chinese defense strategy was rooted in three elements underlying Mao’s intent: political legitimacy for the new regime, a geopolitical context in Cold War East Asia, and military and economic sources available for national defense. Mao’s thought process can be divided into three phases with a gradual increase in his commitment. The first phase indicated China’s “assistance role” during July–August 1950. The second phase, in September, evolved into a “proactive defense” as Mao believed it necessary to send Chinese troops to defend Manchuria in North Korea. The third phase consisted of an “immediate intervention” made in early October, when Mao decided to fight a full-scale war against the U.S. forces. Thereafter, the Korean War essentially became a conflict between China and the United States.
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Notes
- 1.
Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 55.
- 2.
Simei Qing, “The U.S.-China Confrontation in Korea: Assessment of Intentions in Time of Crisis,” in Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Japan, China, and the Two Koreas, ed. James I. Matray (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2012), 109.
- 3.
Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” in Selected Works of Mao, 1: 206, 207.
- 4.
Chu Yun, Chaoxian zhanzheng neimu quangongkai [Declassifying the Korean War] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe [Current Affairs Publishing], 2005), 161; Shen, “China Sends Troops to Korea,” 13.
- 5.
Peng Dehuai concentrated a superior force to outnumber the enemy wherever the situation permitted in order to eliminate entire enemy battalions, regiments, or divisions, rather than to simply repel the enemy from the peninsula. Peng Dehuai Biography Compilation Team, Yige zhanzheng de ren [A Real Man] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe [Contemporary China Press], 2006), 178; Marshal Peng Dehuai, “My Story of the Korean War,” in Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, trans. and eds. Li, Millet, and Yu: 32–33; Military History Research Division, PLA-AMS, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [Combat Experience of the CPVF in the WRUSAK], 11; Pang and Li, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao [Mao Zedong and the Resistance against the U.S. and Assistance to Korea], 30.
- 6.
Mao, “The Great Achievements of the Three Glorious Movements,” a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, October 23, 1951, Mao’s Manuscripts since 1949, 2: 481–86; Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe [People’s Press], 1977), 5: 50–52.
- 7.
Xu, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng [Mao Zedong and the WRUSAK], 59.
- 8.
Bo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollections of Certain Important Decisions and Events], 1: 43.
- 9.
Harold M. Tanner, The Battle for Manchuria and Fate of China (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 2–3.
- 10.
Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 1.
- 11.
Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1948–1964 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), ix.
- 12.
Xu, Junshijia Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong as a Military Leader], 178.
- 13.
Zhou Enlai’s telegram to Gao Gang about CCP Party Center’s decision to make the Chinese railways and airspace in Manchuria available for the Soviet Union on July 11, 1950, Zhou’s Manuscripts since 1949, 3: 31–32.
- 14.
Lei, “The Establishment of the Northeast Border Defense Army, July 1950,” 127–29. Lei was director of the Operation Department of the PLA General Staff and Premier Zhou’s military secretary. Also see Pang and Li, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao [Mao Zedong and the Resistance against the U.S. and Assistance to Korea], 4; Xu, Diyici jiaoliang [The First Encounter], 16–18.
- 15.
General Hong Xuezhi, “The CPVF’s Combat and Logistics,” in Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, trans. and eds. Li, Millett, and Yu, 107–109.
- 16.
According to the CMC order, the main task of the NEBDA was “to defend the borders of the Northeast.” For more details, see Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 156n16; Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 135–37.
- 17.
After receiving Roshchin’s telegram to Moscow, Stalin confirmed Chinese leaders’ concerns of a possible UNF invasion of North Korea. In his telegram to Zhou Enlai on July 5, 1950, Stalin agreed, “We consider it correct to concentrate immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover for these units.” “Filippov (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the PRC N. V. Roshchin),” Ciphered telegram No. 3172, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF), Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, List 79, in “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” Weathersby trans. and ed., Bulletin: Cold War International History Project 6–7 (Winter 1995/1996): 43.
- 18.
CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976], 2: 52–53.
- 19.
Mao’s quote is in Military History Division, PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [Combat Experience of the CPVF in the WRUSAK], 60. Mao also made the same point in his directive to the East Military Region Command on August 11, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 181–82.
- 20.
Bo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollections of Certain Important Decisions and Events], 1: 43.
- 21.
Ibid.
- 22.
The CMC document, drafted by Mao, “CMC Telegram to Gao Gang, August 5, 1950,” trans. and eds. Xiaobing Li, Xi Wang, and Chen Jian, “Mao’s Dispatch of Chinese Troops to Korea: Forty-six Telegrams, July–October 1950,” Chinese Historians 5, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 64; Zhang and Chen, trans. and eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 157.
- 23.
Du, “Political Mobilization and Control,” 62; Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 81.
- 24.
PLA-AMS, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [Combat Experience of the CPVF in the WRUSAK], 6.
- 25.
Du, “Political Mobilization and Control,” 66; Major General Jiang Yonghui, 38 jun zai chaoxian [The Thirty-eighth Army in Korea], 2nd ed. (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe [Liaoning People’s Press], 2009), 20. Jiang was the deputy commander of the Thirty-eighth Army of the CPVF in 1950–1952.
- 26.
Du, ibid., 67. Lieutenant General Du Ping joined the CCP and the Chinese Red Army in 1930. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, he served as the director of the Organization Departments in the Northeast Field Army and then the Fourth Filed Army. After the founding of the PRC, he was director of the political departments in the Thirteenth Army Group. After the Korean War, Du became the director of the Political Departments of Shenyang and then Nanjing Regional Commands, and deputy political commissar of the Shenyang and Nanjing Regional Commands. He was given the rank of lieutenant general in 1955. Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 1: 254–55; Tan, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun renwulu [Veterans Profile of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force], 185–86.
- 27.
Zhou, “The Psychological Problems in the Movement to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea,” a speech on November 25, 1950, Selected Military Works of Zhou, 4: 111–17; Captain Zhou Baoshan (CPVF), interview by the author, Harbin, Heilongjiang, in April 2000.
- 28.
Mao approved the Zhou Enlai and Nie Rongzhen’s July 22 report on July 23, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 171. For the July 22 report, see Zhou and Nie, “The Northeast Military Region Commands and Supplies all of the NEBDA Forces, July 22, 1950,” Selected Military Works of Zhou, 4: 38–40.
- 29.
CCP Heilongjiang Provincial Committee, “Report on the Logistics Supplies and War Preparation for the NEBDA Troops, September 30, 1950,” in Heilongjiang shengzhengfu dang’anshi, 1949–66 [Heilongjiang Provincial Government Archives, 1949–1966], Harbin, Heilongjiang; and Zhou Zhong, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng houqinshi jianbianben [A Concise History of the Logistics in the WRUSAK] (Beijing: Jindun chubanshe [Golden Shield Press], 1993), 18–19.
- 30.
Li Ying, et al. 40 jun zai chaoxian [The Fortieth Army in Korea] (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe [Liaoning People’s Press], 2010), 3; Jiang, Sanshiba jun zai chaoxian [The Thirty-eighth Army in Korea], 20–21.
- 31.
Du, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu [At the CPVF General HQ], 74–75. Du served as director of the Political Department of the CPVF General HQ in 1950–1953.
- 32.
General Song Shilun (1907–1991) joined the CCP in 1927, and the Red Army in 1929. He led CCP guerrilla teams in Hunan, and became a regiment, division, and army commander, chief staff, and political commissar in the Red Army. Song participated in the Long March of 1934–1935. During the Anti-Japanese War of 1937–1945, Song was a division commander and political commissar in the Eighth Route Army. During the Chinese Civil War of 1946–1949, Song was appointed as commander and political commissar of the Ninth Army Group. After the Korean War, Song became the president and political commissar of PLA General Infantry Academy in Nanjing, and was granted general in 1955. He served as the party secretary and vice president of the PLA Academy of Military Science in the 1960s–1970s. See Xinghuo liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 1: 100–101; Tan, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun renwulu [Veterans Profile of the CPVF], 326–27.
- 33.
Military History Research Division, PLA-AMS, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [Combat Experience of the CPVF in WRUSAK], 6.
- 34.
Mao, “Korean War Situation and Our Policy,” speech at the Ninth Plenary of the Central Government of the PRC, September 5, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 201–203; Collected Military Works of Mao, 6: 93–94.
- 35.
Zhou’s report to Mao and Liu Shaoqi on September 3, 1950, Zhou’s Manuscripts since 1949, 2: 247–51.
- 36.
Shen and Xia, A Misunderstood Friendship, 38.
- 37.
Zhou approved North Korea’s request on the same day. “Report, Chen Jiakang to Zhou Enlai; Korea’s Request for Aiming Equipment and Transporting Czechoslovakia’s War Materials to North Korea, September 3, 1950,” File#106-00022-04 (1), 1 (3 pages), PRC Foreign Ministry Archives.
- 38.
Composition Team, Zhiyuanjun diyiren canmaozhang Xie Fang jiangjun [General Xie Fang: The First Chief of Staff of the CPVF] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military Science Press], 1997), 94–95.
- 39.
Gang’s report was attached to Mao’s instruction and reply to Gao and NEBDA on September 3 and 5, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 200n4.
- 40.
Zhou’s telegram to Ambassador Ni Zhiliang and Gao Gang on September 29, 1950, Zhou’s Manuscripts since 1949, 3: 345–46.
- 41.
Gang’s report was attached to Mao’s instruction and reply to Gao and NEBDA on September 3 and 5, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 200n4.
- 42.
Niu, Lengzhan yu xin zhongguo waijiao de yuanqi [The Cold War and Origin of Diplomacy of People’s Republic of China], 285.
- 43.
Mao’s reply to Gao on September 3, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 199.
- 44.
Peng’s words quoted in Hu Zhaocai, Chaoxian zhanzheng, 1950–1953 [The Korean War, 1950–1953] (Beijing: Taihai chubanshe [Taiwan Strait Publishing House], 2017), 130.
- 45.
PLA-AMS, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [Combat Experience of the CPVF in WRUSAK], 6.
- 46.
PLAAF Command’s budget report to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on construction of twelve new airports in Manchuria, September 29, 1950, cited in the notes of Zhou’s report to Mao on September 29, 1950, Zhou’s Manuscripts since 1949, 3: 343n1.
- 47.
Zhou’s report to Mao on budget issues about the construction of new airports on September 29, 1950, Zhou’s Manuscripts since 1949, 3: 342.
- 48.
General Jiang Weiguo (Chiang Wei-kuo, GMD Army, retired), interview by the author at Rongzong Hospital in Taipei, Taiwan, on May 27–28, 1994. General Jiang at that time was the president of the Taiwan Strategic Society after his retirement from the GMD Army. His brother Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) was the ROC president from 1978 to 1988, after their father, Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), died in 1975.
- 49.
Mao pointed out that at the time of the first counter-suppression campaign in Jiangxi, “The principle of ‘luring the enemy in deep’ was put forward and, moreover, successfully applied.” Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Selected Works of Mao, 1: 213; Mao, “Telegram to Central Committee, September 30, 1932,” Collected Military Works of Mao, 1: 305–306.
- 50.
Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 199.
- 51.
Yang Kuisong, Zouxiang polie: Mao Zedong yu Moscow de enen yuanyuan [Toward the Split; Interests and Conflicts between Mao Zedong and Moscow] (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian [Three-Alliance Publishing], 1999), 41–42.
- 52.
Xu, Junshijia Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong as a Military Leader], 114–15.
- 53.
General Jiang, interview by the author at Rongzong Hospital in Taipei, Taiwan, on May 27–28, 1994.
- 54.
War History Division, National Defense University (NDU), Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi jianbian [A Concise History of the PLA’s War-Fighting] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1990), 121; Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution: 1895–1949 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 288.
- 55.
Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 1: 206, 207.
- 56.
Ibid., 1: 240.
- 57.
M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 40–41.
- 58.
Mao’s conversation with Wang Jifan (Mao’s cousin) and Zhou Shizhao (Mao’s classmate at the Hunan First Normal College) on October 27, 1950, quoted http://bbs.creaders.net/history/bbsviewer.php?trd_id=1368581
- 59.
Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu: Du Ping huiyilu [At the CPVF General HQ: Memoirs of Du Ping] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1989), 15, 17–18. Du served as director of the Political Department of the CPVF General HQ in 1950–1953. The quotation is from Xu, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng [Mao Zedong and WRUSAK], 59.
- 60.
Major General Xu Changyou, interview by the author in Shanghai on April 26–27, 2000. Xu served as the deputy secretary general of the CCP Central Military Commission.
- 61.
Mao, “Korean War Situation and Our Policy,” speech at the Ninth Plenary of the Central Government of the PRC, September 5, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 201–203; Collected Military Works of Mao, 6: 93–94.
- 62.
Major General Xu, interview by the author in Shanghai on April 26–27, 2000. Xu served as the deputy secretary general of the CCP Central Military Commission.
- 63.
Chai, Banmendian tanpan jishi [The True Stories of the Panmunjom Negotiations], 79.
- 64.
Kim Il-sung’s letter quoted in Shen and Xia, A Misunderstood Friendship, 42.
- 65.
Mao’s words quoted in “Dang’an” [Archives] by Beijing TV, Weida de kangmei yuanchao, II: jueze [Great WRUSAK, 2: Decision], series no. 771, https://tv.sohu.com/v/MjAxNDAzMTEvbjM5NjM3MzQ5Mi5zaHRtbA
- 66.
Mao’s conversations with Wang Jifan and Zhou Shizhao on October 27, 1950, from the recollections of Wang Yuqing, grandson of Wang Jifan, in Junshi lishi (Military History) vols. 88–93; Guandong zhuojia [Authors from Northeast China] 9 (2003); Zhiqingzhe shuo [The Inside Stories] 2 (2005): 3–4. See also Xu, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng [Mao Zedong and the WRUSAK], 146.
- 67.
Zhou’ speech at the CPVF commanders meeting on February 17, 1958, Selected Military Works of Zhou, 4: 394–96.
- 68.
Mao’s quote was omitted when his telegram of October 14, 1950, was included and published in Collected Military Works of Mao, 6: 122–23. The omitted sentences were published for the first time in Dang de wenxian [Party Archives and Documents] 5 (2000): 8.
- 69.
Stalin’s telegram in the Presidential Archives of Russia, f45, o1, d337, 167, quoted in Shen, “China Sends Troops to Korea,” 28; Shen, Mao Zedong, Stalin he chaoxian zhanzheng [Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War], 221.
- 70.
General Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi [Recollections of WRUSAK] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe [PLA Literature Press], 1990), 14–15.
- 71.
Nie, “Beijing’s Decision to Intervene,” 41; Wang Shuzeng, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun zhengzhan jishi [The True Story of the CPVF’s War Experience] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi [PLA Literature Press], 2001), 85; Shen, Mao Zedong, Stalin he chaoxian zhanzheng [Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War], 228–29.
- 72.
Shen, “China Sends Troops to Korea,” 29; Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 281n78.
- 73.
Mao talked about this difficult decision a couple of times during and after the Korean War. See Marshal Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [Memoir of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 1984), 2: 935; Xu, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng [Mao Zedong and theWRUSAK], 4.
- 74.
Pang and Li, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao [Mao Zedong and the Resistance against the U.S. and Assistance to Korea], 7.
- 75.
Mao’s conversation with the delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Beijing, September 23, 1956, quoted ibid., 7–8.
- 76.
For more detailed discussions on the Soviet factors in recent works, see Tao Wenzhao, Zhongmei guanxishi, 1949–1972 [PRC-U.S. Relations, 1949–1972] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe [Shanghai People’s Press], 1999), 24–25; Major General Qi Dexue (PLA), “Several Issues on the Resisting U.S. and Aiding Korean War,” Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu [CCP Party History Research] 1 (1998): 75–76; Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force; Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82–89.
- 77.
The PRC and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty on February 14, 1950, in Moscow. The treaty stated that if one side was attacked by a third country, the other side “must go all out to provide military and other assistance.” Mao, “Telegram to Liu Shaoqi, January 25, 1950,” Mao’s Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 251–52; Zhang and Chen, trans. and eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 140–41.
- 78.
Peng, “My Story of the Korean War,” 32.
- 79.
Yang and Wang, Beiwei 38 duxian [The North Latitude 38th Parallel], 90. After the Korean War, Peng was appointed the defense minister of the PRC and became one of the ten marshals of the PLA in 1955. Before long, however, Mao dismissed Peng from all posts in 1959, accusing him of leading an “anti-Party clique” or a “military club” against Mao’s policy of the Great Leap Forward. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, Peng was arrested and imprisoned in 1967. He died on November 29, 1974. See also Peng Dehuai Biography Compilation Team, Yige zhanzheng de ren [A Real Man], 237–53, 313–35; Allan R. Millett, Their War for Korea: American, Asian, and European combatants and civilians, 1945–1953 (Washington, DC: Brassy’s, 2002), 106–11.
- 80.
Marshal Peng Dehuai enlisted at seventeen in the Hunan Army (xiangjun) of the warlords, and attended Hunan Military Academy. He served as a GMD officer and became a brigade commander before defecting. In 1928, Peng joined the CCP, and then commanded the Fifth Army of the Chinese Red Army. His revolutionary fervor and military aggressiveness gained Mao’s attention and favor by 1930. Peng’s army led the vanguard of the 1934–1935 Long March. During the Anti-Japanese War, he served as deputy commander of the Eighth Route Army, acting secretary general of the CCP North Bureau, and vice chairman and chief of General Staff of the Central Revolutionary Military Committee. During the Civil War, he commanded the Eighteenth Army Group, the Northwestern Field Army, and the First Field Army. Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan [Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe [Contemporary China Publishing], 1993), 372, 388; Xinghuo Liaoyuan Composition Department, Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun jiangshuai minglu [Marshals and Generals of the PLA], 1: 20; Peng, “My Story of the Korean War,” 30.
- 81.
Wang, Peng Dehuai zhuan [Biography of Peng Dehuai], 402.
- 82.
Mao’s words quoted in Peng, “My Story of the Korean War,” 32.
- 83.
Peng, ibid., 33; Peng Dehuai Biography Compilation Team, Yige zhanzheng de ren [A Real Man], 166–67.
- 84.
Nie, “Beijing’s Decision to Intervene,” 42; Wang et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan [Biography of Peng Dehuai], 402–403; Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 246–47.
- 85.
Nie, ibid., 42; Pang and Li, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao [Mao Zedong and the Resistance against the U.S. and Assistance to Korea], 18–22.
- 86.
Zhou Enlai Military Record Compilation Team, comp., Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi [The Records of Zhou Enlai’s Military Affairs], 2: 148.
- 87.
Qing, “The US-China Confrontation in Korea, Assessment of Intention in Time of Crisis,” 109.
- 88.
Mao, “CMC Order to Establish the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force,” Collected Military Works of Mao, 6: 117; Collected Works of Mao, 6: 100–101; Zhang and Chen, trans. and eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 164–65.
- 89.
Mao’s conversation with Kim Il-sung quoted in CCP Central Archives and CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Dang de wenxian [Party’s Archives and Manuscripts] 5 (2000): 13.
- 90.
Yang and Wang, Beiwei 38 duxian [The North Latitude 38th Parallel], 106; Major General Xu Yan, “Chinese Forces and Their Casualties in the Korean War,” trans. Xiaobing Li, in Chinese Historians 6, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 48.
- 91.
Zhou Military Record Compilation Team, comp., Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi [The Records of Zhou Enlai’s Military Affairs], 2: 148.
- 92.
CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Research Division, Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976], 1: 85–87; General Hong Xuezhi, Hong Xuezhi Huiyilu (Memoirs of Hong Xuezhi) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe [PLA Press], 2007), 373–74.
- 93.
For Mao’s confirmation orders and telegrams to his officials and generals, see Mao’s telegrams to Chen Yi, “Order the Ninth Army Group to Move North Ahead of Schedule, October 12 and 14;” to Zhou, “We Believe that We Should and Must Enter the War, October 13;” and “The Guidelines and Deployment for the CPVF to Enter Korea and Participate in the War, October 14, 1950,” Mao’s Military Manuscripts since 1949, 1: 246, 248, 252–53, 256–59; Zhang and Chen, trans. and eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 168–71.
- 94.
Mao’s telegram to Chen Yi at 1:00 am on October 14, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscript since 1949, 1: 255.
- 95.
The X Corps intelligence’s quote in South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950), U.S. Army in the Korean War, by Roy E. Appleman (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History and U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 756.
- 96.
Mao’s telegram to Peng and Gao [Gang] at 6:00 am on October 29, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscript since 1949, 1: 306–307.
- 97.
Mao’s quote is from Song Chongshi’s Hujiang Song Shilun [A Tiger General: Song Shilun] (Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe [Intellectual Rights Publishing], 2013), 154–55.
- 98.
Mao’s telegram to Peng and Gao [Gang] at 10:00 am on October 27, 1950, Mao’s Military Manuscript since 1949, 1: 317.
- 99.
Chu, Chaoxian zhanzheng neimu quangongkai [Declassifying the Korean War], 161; Shen, “China Sends Troops to Korea,” 13.
- 100.
Peng concentrated a superior force to outnumber the enemy wherever the situation permitted in order to eliminate entire enemy battalions, regiments, or divisions, rather than to simply repel the enemy from the peninsula. Peng Dehuai Biography Compilation Team, Yige zhanzheng de ren [A Real Man], 178; Peng, “My Story of the Korean War,” 32–33; Military History Research Division, PLA-AMS, Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi [Combat Experience of the CPVF in the WRUSAK], 11; Pang and Li, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao [Mao Zedong and the Resistance against the U.S. and Assistance to Korea], 30.
- 101.
Peng, “Speech at the CPVF Army and Division Commanders Meeting, October 14, 1950,” Military Papers of Peng, 324.
- 102.
Among the major works by leading Chinese military historians are Xu, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng [Mao Zedong and the WRUSAK]; Pang and Li, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuanchao [Mao Zedong and the Resistance against the U.S. and Assistance to Korea]; Yang and Wang, Beiwei 38 duxian [The North Latitude 38th Parallel]; Chai, Banmendian tanpan jishi [The True Stories of the Panmunjom Negotiations]. Senior Colonel Yang was Peng’s military assistant and deputy director of the Peng’s Executive Office at the CPVF General HQs in 1950–1953. Major General Chai served as chargé d’affaires of the PRC to the DPRK from July 10 to August 12, 1950, when China opened its embassy at Pyongyang. Chai was then head of the PRC military mission to North Korea from August 1950 to January 1955.
- 103.
Kennedy, “Military Audacity”; Yuan Xi, “The Truth,” Suibi [Daily Records] (no. 6, 1999).
- 104.
Shen, Mao Zedong, Stalin he chaoxian zhanzheng [Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War]; Stueck, The Korean War; Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War.
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Li, X. (2019). Active Defense: From Manchuria to Korea. In: China’s War in Korea. New Directions in East Asian History. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9675-6_4
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