Abstract
Adil Alsaid and Chris J. Mitchell proposed the possibility of fake root public key installation by an attacker in user’s PC and showed its countermeasures in 2005. The root public keys are used to verify the certificates for applet providers. Therefore the insertion of false public keys allows arbitrary numbers of rogue application to be executed on a user’s PC. We propose a protection method for installing fake root keys in a user’s PC. The method uses the one-time hash chain based on NOVOMODO. In the proposal, as the computation costs and the storage amounts for hash chain are very small, the proposed method will not be a big load to the publisher of the browser, the applet provision agent and the user. The implementation of the method is simple and it offers convenient authentication of the root to the user. Therefore, the method can provide a intelligent and secure agent technique for the digital content distribution.
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References
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Lee, Y., Ahn, J., Kim, S., Won, D. (2007). A Countermeasure of Fake Root Key Installation Using One-Time Hash Chain. In: Nguyen, N.T., Grzech, A., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications. KES-AMSTA 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4496. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72830-6_107
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72830-6_107
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