Abstract
The chapter takes the problem space outlined by Martin Heidegger in his famously controversial lecture series What is called thinking? as a starting point to discuss which forms of thinking, which methods and bodies of knowledges in the academic discipline of education are promoted, and which are marginalized and devalued by narrow concepts of objectivity and rationality. I will focus on two questions in particular: Which forms of thinking do we intend to encourage and foster through education? And secondly, which forms of thinking and knowledge production are called for when we consider education and upbringing in the educational sciences, and what is the role of educational philosophy in this context? Building on Alice Crary’s work in Beyond Moral Judgment(2007), I argue that the critique of narrow conceptions of rationality and objectivity should not lead to a dismissal of these notions but rather to their broadening so that the cultivation of our affective and emotional sensitivities is understood as part and parcel of developing a rational and objective understanding of the world. Starting from such a revised conception of rationality, I further argue that it is one of the main tasks of philosophy of education, to keep alive the sense that it is possible and worthwhile to address the moral dimension of education in serious and rational argument without falling prey to a narrow focus on moral judgment nor to certain problematic forms of moralistic arrogance.
An earlier version of this chapter is published as Schumann, C. (2017). Was Heisst Denken in der Pädagogik? In M. Spiker & Stojanov, K. (eds.). Bildungsphilosophie. Disziplin – Gegenstandsbereich – Politische Bedeutung (pp. 243–256). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
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Notes
- 1.
Some postmodern approaches could be placed here and, depending on interpretation, quite possibly also Richard Rorty’s idea of philosophy as a voice in the ongoing dialogue of mankind.
- 2.
Here we could place approaches within educational theory which emphasize the importance of dialogue in education, following authors like Jürgen Habermas and other theorists.
- 3.
A very instructive example of the blind spots and difficulties that a narrow focus on moral judgments and the most exact possible formulation of moral principles can lead to can be found in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s critical examination of Peter Singer’s theses (cf. Singer 1972) in Der Kosmopolit (Appiah 2007, pp. 192–194). Appiah stresses, countering Singer, that “our moral intuition is often more secure than the principles to which we refer to explain it” (Appiah 2007, p. 193) and that very different principles can be derived from Singer’s example. The moral rigor of Singer becomes particularly apparent when Appiah plays through other variants of the consequences that we can draw from the thought experiment of the drowning child from what he calls the Singer Principle. Through different contextualizations of the principle, especially in the detailed and informed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different strategies to combat world poverty, Appiah not only makes clear what it would mean to adequately do justice in practice to the complexity of the moral questions judged by Singer according to general principles, but he also clearly shows the paradoxical consequences that can result from a rigid moralism of Singer’s manner and opposes this with a context-sensitive pragmatism.
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Schumann, C. (2020). What Is Called Thinking in Education?. In: Strand, T. (eds) Rethinking Ethical-Political Education. Contemporary Philosophies and Theories in Education, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49524-4_11
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