Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to eliminate a seeming redundancy in Roman Ingarden’s theory of perceptual intentionality and, through this, provide a modest and partial defense of his theory. I shall first argue that, contrary to an impression one might initially have, Ingarden’s notion of purely intentional objects of perception is not superfluous; purely intentional objects of perception play a role as representational contents. Second, I shall point out that Ingarden’s theory has some merits that prove it to be worthy of serious and closer consideration for us today.
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Notes
- 1.
See Thomasson (1999).
- 2.
I do not hold that the problem of perceptual experience is the only context out of which Ingarden’s discussions of purely intentional objects arose. By the summer of 1923, he completes his Habilitationsschrift in Polish, which is published in German in 1925 under the title “Essentiale Fragen” (cf. Mitscherling 1997, p. 18). In this work, Ingarden holds the numerical distinction between these two types of objects in the context of the theory of judgment and questioning (cf. EF, chapter 1).
- 3.
Ingarden’s definition of autonomous existence is as follows: “An entity (in the sense of any something at all) exists autonomously (is existentially autonomous) if it has its external foundation within itself”. In Ingarden’s system, autonomous existence, which is contrasted with heteronomous existence, is further explicated in terms of three other pairs of existential independence/dependence. See Simons (2005) for a detailed exposition of this.
- 4.
Ingarden’s ontology could be characterized as phenomenological also by virtue of its strongly descriptive or non-reductive tendency. See Chrudzimski (2004).
- 5.
In the present paper, I confine myself to the original intentionality of experience, ignoring the derivative intentionality possessed by linguistic signs etc., which plays an important role in Ingarden’s theory of literary works of art. For the distinction between original and derivative intentionality, see Galewicz (1994, pp. 9–10).
- 6.
More precisely, Ingarden holds that idealism also consists in conceiving the world as a region of objects, as an intentional object. Since I do not focus on the issue concerning idealism and realism, I ignore the problem of the world for the sake of simplicity. For Ingarden’s ontological analysis of the world, see Chapter XV of Streit II/2. See also Rynkiewicz (2008, pp. 409–412) for a summery.
- 7.
Such a formulation is of course not without textual evidence. In Ideen I, Husserl writes: “Reality, the reality of a thing taken individually as well as the reality of the entire world, essentially dispenses (in our rigorous sense) with self-sufficiency. It is not in itself something absolute, binding itself secondarily to something else; instead it is in the absolute sense nothing at all, it has no “absolute essence,” it has the essential character of something that is in principle only intentional, only relative to that of which it is conscious, that which presents itself and appears in accord with consciousness” (Hua III/1, p. 106 [=Husserl 2014, pp. 90–91], our italics).
- 8.
In what follows, I use “experience” only as a synonym of “lived-experience.”
- 9.
In what follows I consider relations to be properties (in a wider sense) for the sake of simplicity.
- 10.
In Ingarden’s own terminology, the non-standard instantiation is called “Aktualisierung,” whereas the standard instantiation is called “Vereinzelung.” The terms the standard/non-standard exemplifications, as well as the nomal/modified senses of to be, is taken from from Chrudzimski (2015).
- 11.
Because of the lack of any other suitable term than “content” in English, I translate “Inhalt” and “Gehalt” to “content” and the capitalized “Content” respectively. Note that “The Content of a purely intentional object is a content” would then not be trivial, just like the German sentence “Der Gehalt des rein intentionalen Gegenstandes ist ein Inhalt” is not.
- 12.
Note that the term “material properties” here has only to do with something of which an artifact is made of. In what follows I use the term exclusively in this ordinary, non-technical sense.
- 13.
Ingarden’s analysis of purely intentional object in, on which my discussion is based, is part of ontology as an investigation of essence. For this conception of ontology in Ingarden, see Rynkiewicz (2008, pp. 354–359). For more critical and revisionary discussions, see Haefliger (1994, pp. 89–100) and Chrudzimski (2004, pp. 132–140).
- 14.
See the quotation from Ideen I in note 7 above.
- 15.
Husserl himself would probably agree that real objects are double-sided and indeterminate, at least if real objects are not numerically distinct of noemata. In Ideen I, Husserl unambiguously claims that a noema consists of two strata: noematic sense and thetic character (cf. Hua III/1, pp. 210–211 [=Husserl 2014, pp. 180–181]). Those two strata seem to correspond to the Content and structure of purely intentional objects respectively. If this is true, noema would have indeterminacy in Ingarden’s sense, because some “predicates” that belong to the noematic meaning of a noema are considered to be undetermined (cf. Hua III/1, p. 300 [=Husserl 2014, p. 259]).
- 16.
This example is a modified version of the one given by Kim (2010, pp. 37–38). The term “intentional properties” to appear below is also taken from him.
- 17.
In the present paper, I assume with Ingarden and Husserl that perceptual experience is intentional.
- 18.
“Das, worauf sich die äußeren Wahrnehmungen […] beziehen, bildet ein System von Gegenständen, das die ‘materielle Welt’ gennant wird” (RIGW 8, p. 50).
- 19.
This idea, it seems, is suggested by Thomasson when she writes: “typically the object of a hallucinatory act is created by that act itself, whereas the object of a veridical perceptual act is just picked out by that intentional act, not created by it”. (1999, p. 90).
- 20.
This is exactly the reason why Ingarden inserts the phrase “if it [=a real object] exists” in parentheses when he characterizes real objects as something also intentional in the Literarishe Kunstwerk. I owe this point to Galewicz (1994, p. 11).
- 21.
For a comprehensible defense of his account from a systematic point of view, see also Chrudzmiski (2015). Note that in those works, Chrudzimski’s account is confined to purely intentional objects of nominal acts or experiences, which include not only presentation [Vorstellung] but also perception.
- 22.
See Fish (2010, chaper 5) for a concise overview of intentionalism. Note that, as will be emphasized in Concluding Remarks, Ingarden’s position is not solely intentionalist.
- 23.
This might not be the complete description of how your experience of seeing a chair represents the world, but it would probably suffice for the illustration of the idea at stake.
- 24.
See Searle (1983, pp. 10–11) for the locus classicus of this equation.
- 25.
Chrudzimski (1999, p. 107, 2005a, p. 102) only refers to the page number of the work, but in all likelihood has he following sentence in mind: “Sie [=Erkenntnisakte] erfüllen ihren Zweck und erweisen ihre Seinsberechtung dann und nur dann, wenn es dem Bewusstseinssubjekt in ihrem Vollzug gelingt, diese Deckung […] zu erreichen [They fulfill their purpose and demontrate the legitimacy of their existence if and only if in excercising them the subject of consciousness succeeds in attaining this coincidence].” (Streit II/1, p. 206 [tr., vol. II, p. 202]). Elsewhere he quotes the following passage from the Literarische Kunstwerk: “Das intentional geschaffene Ding “ist”—im strengen, seinsautonomen Sinne—z.B. nicht “rot”. Damit es das sein könnte, müßte es eine echte Realisation der Wesenheit “Röte” in sich reell enthalten. Gerade dieses reelle Enthaltensein, dieses Immanentsein der Realisation einer idealen Wesenheit in einer Gegenständlichkeit und andererseits auch diese Realisation selbst vermag der reine Bewußtseinsakt nicht hervorzubringen. Es bleibt immer nur bei dem früher beschriebenen vortäuschenden Quasi-Enthaltensein und bei der Quasi-Realisation, die einerseits auf das intentionale sic iubeo des Bewußtseinssubjektes, andererseits auf die entsprechende ideale Wesenheit zurückweist” (LK, p. 388 quoted in Chrudzimski 2004, p. 131, n14). However, I do not find this textual evidence to be decisive. Here we may well understand Ingarden as merely taking about the difference, rather than the correspondence, between purely intentional and real objects.
- 26.
In German: “Von diesem bloß [=rein] intentionalen Sachverhalt muß man den objektiven Sachverhalt unterscheiden, der unabhängig von dem Erkenntnissubjekte und dem Urteilssatze existiert. Er wird zum Gegenstande des Urteils, wenn zwischen ihm und dem objectum formale eines bestimmten Urteils die merkwürdige Beziehung der Identifizierung besteht; sie muß hinsichtlich aller Momente des intentionalen Urteilsgegenstandes—außer seinem bloß intentionalen Seinsstruktur—bestehen, braucht aber nicht notwendig zu bestehen aller Momente des objektiven Sachverhalts.”
- 27.
As is obvious in the above quote, the terminology in 1925 is slightly different from the one established in the Literarische Kunstwerk (LK); instead of “purely intentional objects,” for instance, Ingarden uses “merely [bloß] intentional objects.” In addition, Essentiale Fragen contains a passage in which he seems to deny that purely intentional objects fall under a peculiar ontological category, if, just as in his later works, he regards fictive objects as a sort of purely intentional objects: “Sie [=die fiktive Gegenstände] exitieren aber nicht. Es gibt bloß […] Vorstellungen bzw. Unanschauliche Meinungen von ihnen” (EF, p. 180).
- 28.
Ingarden’s formulation of the correspondence between two types of states of affairs is drastically modified in the Streit um die Existenz der Welt (cf. Streit II/1, §53). There he denies the ontological autonomy of negative states of affairs, which would be admitted if he adopts the formulation of the correspondence in Essentiale Fragen. Further on Ingarden’s later theory of states of affairs, see Chrudzimski (2010, 2012).
- 29.
See Simons (1994, esp. pp. 553–557) for the notion of tropes and their presence in Husserl.
- 30.
In the present paper except this paragraph, I have been and will be using the term “properties” only in the sense of universals
- 31.
Chrudzimski is in fact aware of this problem. See Churdzimski 1999, p. 109, note 328. Regrettably, I do not deal with this issue, since, for linguistic reasons, I could not consult a paper of his he cited due to the fact that it was written in Polish.
- 32.
It is not easy to determine what this apprehension amounts to, but the following discussion is neutral with regard to a main point of dispute among interpreters of Husserl: Whether or not the apprehension involves the actualization of our conceptual faculty. See Mooney (2010) for an overview of the debate.
- 33.
In the Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl uses the term “signitive intention” to refer to the empty intention in perceptual experience (cf. Hua XIX/2, pp. 594–595).
- 34.
See Mulligan (1995, pp. 193–194) for details of Husserl’s argument. Mulligan thereby points out that “Husserl does not characterize positively the awareness in perception of the invisible side of the house” (1995, p. 194). To this remark, however, we can raise an objection. What is at stake here is, in a certain sense, something absent from perceptual experience; there is a sense in which the invisible side of, say, the house is missing in the perceptual experience. Given this, and given the fact that it is no use for Husserl to appeal to non-perceptual experiences that are known to us (such as judgment, expectation and imagination) in the present context, the emptiness of perceptual intentionality can and must be understood as the best available positive characterization of our awareness of the invisible side.
- 35.
Ingarden claims that the Content of a purely intentional object is determined by the non-intuitive content of the corresponding experience (cf. Streit II/2, pp. 211, 217, 219–220).
- 36.
In German: “Es ist aber nicht leicht, diesen Gegenstand zur distinkten Enthüllung zu bringen und ihn dem radical transzendenten, als “real” gegebenen Gegenstande der Wahrnehmung scharf gegenüberzustellen.”
- 37.
In German: “Wir lassen, z.B. unsere Phantasie frei auf dem Untergrunde einer sinnlichen Wahrnehmung walten: wir betrachten eine Schar leichter Wolken am Himmel und beginnen, in einzelne Wölkchen verschiedene Gestalten “einzuzeichnen”. Wir “sehen” dann z.B. ein Schiff, von einer Schar Kähne umgeben, sich dem Ufer einer Meeresbucht nähern. Wir nützen die Gestalten der “wirklichen”, soeben gesehenen Wolken und Wölkchen, um auf ihrem Untergrund andere Gestalten zu entwerfen, wobei manches an den Wolken abgerundet wird, manches abgeschnitten oder verdunkelt, ein anderes aber überhaupt übersehen, und dann deuten wir in diese neugeformten Gestalten einen durchaus neuen gegenständlichen “Sinn” hinein: es ist keine Wolke mehr, sondern ein “Schiff”, und keine helleren Teile der Wolke, sondern “aufgebauschte Segel” und dgl. mehr.”
- 38.
In German: “[S]ie [sind] eigentlich “an sich” ein Nichts und doch irgendwie mit Eigenschaften ausgestattet.”
- 39.
In the present paper, I have been assuming that sortal properties (for instance, the property of being a chair) can be the content of perceptual experience. This is indeed a disputable assumption, but I make it only for the sake of a simpler exposition of Ingarden’s theory. The most important part of Ingarden’s theory, namely the projective account of perceptual intentionality would remain the same even if the range of the projected properties are limited to lower properties. See Siegel (2006) for further on the view that higher properties can be the content of perceptual experience.
- 40.
In fact, Ingarden seems to admit representational content in addition to purely intentional objects under the title “non-intuitive contents.” As Chrudzmski (2005a, pp. 106–112; 2015) argues, non-intuitive contents are a superfluous component of Ingarden’s theory, which he should not have accepted.
- 41.
This is a version of what Barry Smith (1989, p. 163) calls the “linkage problem”: What is the relation between propositions as linguistic meanings and propositional attitudes in which they are “grasped”? It is noteworthy that Michael Dummett’s reply to this problem is not applicable in the present context (cf. Dummett 1992, pp. 63–64). Since no language is involved in perceptual experience as such, one cannot appeal to language, as Dummett does, as our only access to meaning or content.
- 42.
Madary (2010) proposes a detailed account of how Husserl’s theory well accommodates the perceptual constancy (recall that Ingarden’s idea stems from Husserl). See also Millar (2011) Williford (2013) for attempts to defend the Husserlian view that perceptual experience has non-intentional, sensational components.
- 43.
See note 25 above.
References
Works by Ingarden
EF=Ingarden, Roman. 1925. “Essentiale Fragen. Ein Beitreag zum Wesensproblem.” Reprented in his Über das Wesen, P. McCormick (ed.). Heidelberg: Karl Winder, 2007.
LK=Ingarden, R. 1931/72. Das literarische Kunswerk. 4th edition, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. (English translation: Roman IngardenThe Literary Work of Art. G. G. Grabowicz (tr.), Evanston (Ill.): Northwestern University Press, 1973.)
Streit=Ingarden, Roman. 1964/65. Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. 2 volumes, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. (English translation: Roman Ingarden, Controversy Over the Existence of the World, 2 vols, A. Szylewicz (tr.), Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 2013/2016.)
RIGW=Ingarden, Roman. 1992ff. Gesammelte Werke. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
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Hua=Husserl, Edmund. 1950ff. Husserliana. Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke, Den Haag et al.: Martinus Nijhoff/Kluwer/Springer.
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———. 2014. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans. D.O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett.
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Uemura, G. (2019). Demystifying Roman Ingarden’s Purely Intentional Objects of Perception. In: de Warren, N., Taguchi, S. (eds) New Phenomenological Studies in Japan. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 101. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11893-8_11
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