Abstract
In Chapter One it was observed that, even after the reorganisation of NATO’s command structure in 1951, the British COS as a collective body showed little interest in reassessing the place of Norway in its defence priorities. By late 1951 and early 1952, however, such lack of interest no longer applied to all three services. In the early 1950s, Admiralty thinking — specifically as it applied to the employment of the Fleet Air Arm — evolved in a manner which again led to an emphasis on the importance of Norway and its contiguous seas in British naval policy. This chapter addresses three issues. First, it looks at the principal reasons — strategic, political, and bureaucratic — for the resurgence of the Royal Navy’s interest in Norway before the 1957 Defence Review. Second, it examines the impact of Sandys’s Defence Review on British naval policy, looking in particular at the American reactions to the changes in the Royal Navy’s NATO commitment. Finally, it explores some of the additional factors which, in 1957–58, further increased Norway’s importance in US maritime strategy.
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Notes
General Eisenhower to George Marshall, 12 March 1951, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XIII, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 120.
Clive Archer, Uncertain Trust: The British-Norwegian Defence Relationship (Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1989), p. 23.
Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II (London: The Bodley Head, 1987), p. 204.
The success of carrier operations around the Korean peninsula, particularly close air support for the land-battle, was taken by both the Admiralty and the US Navy as a vindication of the utility of the carrier. See Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy: Fourth Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 240.
Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945 (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 5–6
Martin S. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955–1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 139–140.
The two fleet carriers available at the time were HMS Eagle, which had joined the fleet in October 1951, and the older HMS Indomitable. HMS Ark Royal followed some three-and-a-half years later. Fleet Carriers were functionally equivalent to US attack carriers (CVA), although they clearly did not match the USS Forrestal class of carriers. See B.B. Schofield, British Sea Power: Naval Policy in the Twentieth Century (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd. 1967), p. 221.
Eric J. Grove, Battle for the Fjords: NATO’s Forward Maritime Strategy In Action (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1991), p. 10.
The Navy case for the “aircraft-carrier striking force” in 1955 is clearly spelt out in an article representative of Admiralty opinion by Rear-Admiral A.D. Torlesse, ‘The Role of the Aircraft Carrier,’ Brassey’s Annual 1955 (London: William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 1956).
S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945, Volume I: The Defensive (London: HMSO, 1954), pp. 169–178.
Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten (London: Fontana/Collins, 1986), p. 167.
S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea III, Part II: The Offensive, (London: HMSO, 1961), pp. 262–263.
See Captain H.H. McWilliam, “Sea Power and Aircraft,” Brassey’s Annual 1953 (London: William Clowes & Son. Ltd. 1954).
For further discussion see Mats Berdal, British Naval Policy and Norwegian Security: Maritime Power in Transition, 1951–60 (Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1992), pp. 26–28.
Wyn Rees, “The 1957 Sandys Defence White Paper: New Priorities in British Defence Policy?” The Journal of Strategic Studies 12 (June 1989), p. 226.
David Greenwood, “Defence and National Priorities since 1945,” in British Defence Policy in a Changing World, ed. J. Baylis (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 186–188
R.N. Rosecrance, Defence of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 178–180.
Ibid.See also Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1992), p. 51.
Ibid. None of these results were publicised in the official press releases which only referred to the performance of conventional submarines. In January 1958 Nautilus was fitted with a new nuclear core, increasing her endurance by as much as 80%. See D.W. Morley, “Technology and Weapons,” in The Soviet Navy, ed. M.G. Saunders (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1958), p. 204.
Wyn Rees, “Brothers in Arms: Anglo-American defence co-operation in 1957,” in Post-war Britain, 1945–64: Themes and Perspectives, ed. A. Gorst, L. Johnman and W.S. Lucas (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), p. 213.
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© 1997 Mats R. Berdal
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Berdal, M.R. (1997). British Naval Policy, 1953–60: Implications for Norway and American Commitments in the North Atlantic. In: The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 1954–60. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13370-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13370-3_5
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