Abstract
The article examines two cases of adoption of evolutionary ways of thinking by modern economists: Nelson and Winter’s (Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 1982), and evolutionary game theory (1990s and after). In both cases, the authors explicitly refer to natural selection in an economic context. I show that natural selection is taken in two different senses, which correspond to two general conceptions of the principle of natural selection, one of which contains reproduction and heredity as key elements, whereas the other does not.
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Notes
A rather harsh debate ensued about whether such an ecological concept of natural selection is useful. Lewontin (1970, 2009), for instance, has expressed serious doubts: without reproduction and heritability, there is only a process of differential elimination, not an indefinite and open process of transformation.
This is why this approach is said to be “eductive.” “Eductive” contrasts with “adaptive.” An eductive approach postulates that rational agents, following a reasoning process, can deduce that an equilibrium should occur. The time necessary for a real agent to come to this conclusion is not taken into account. Adaptive learning operates in real time..
This is an allusion to the philosopher David Lewis (1941–2001). In his book Convention (1969), Lewis makes use of the notion of “common knowledge.” An example of common knowledge would be that everyone knows p, and everyone knows that everyone knows p. Walliser’s expression “Lewisian hand” refers to an equilibrium guided by the existence of a common knowledge. If economic agents adjust their behavior through learning, their behavior may converge to something “rational” in the economist’s sense of the word, as a result of the “common knowledge” that they come to share.
In simple terms, a group of players is in a Nash equilibrium if each one is making the best decision that he or she can, taking into account the decisions of the others.
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Acknowledgments
I thank Abigail Lustig for her fruitful comments and careful linguistic revision of this paper, which would not be what it is without her help. Thanks also to the anonymous reviewer for her fruitful comments and queries.
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Gayon, J. Economic Natural Selection: What Concept of Selection?. Biol Theory 6, 320–325 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-012-0042-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-012-0042-6