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Closing the gaps in air cargo security

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Abstract

The study investigated if establishing common international security standards through mutually recognized security programs would make the air cargo supply chain less vulnerable to terrorist activity and increase trade efficiencies. Divergent air cargo security programs result in separate measures that lack a unified front against terrorism and slow the shipping process. By proposing the Global Protocol for Air Cargo (GPAC) to the aviation security community, I examine the idea of an international framework to unite government and industry to create the most secure and efficient aviation cargo supply chain to date. The research overall explores ways to unify air cargo stakeholders by raising the bar on security measures and absorbing the burdens placed on securing the aviation industry.

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Notes

  1. Alternatives to risk based approaches, such as the 100 % security screening of all pieces of cargo, are unfeasible to implement. However, risk based approaches must balance the probability of an incident occurring along with the impact it will have if the incident occurs. Terror networks exploit vulnerabilities and infiltrate systems through lower-risk domains. Risk-based security program developers must be aware of bias and perception, which are often problems when identifying risk considerations. Probability assessment procedures and proper oversight of risk management performance is essential because the nature of risk based solutions are inherently difficult to assess and are crucial elements to risk based solution development.

  2. The author conducted research through personal interviews with aviation security professionals. Any views or opinions expressed by the professionals in this paper are their own and do not necessarily represent those of the organization of which they belong. Interviewed aviation security and cargo experts for this research were: Alterman, Stephen, President, Air Cargo Association; Dunlap, Kenneth, Senior Fellow, George Washington University Center for Cyber and Homeland Security; Laustra, Mark, Vice President, Sales and Government Programs, Astrophysics, Inc.; Marriott, Jim, Deputy Director, Aviation and Security Facilitation, ICAO; and Merritt, Elizabeth, Cargo Services Department, Airlines for America.

  3. Governments selected for the case studies were limited to the availability of the government’s national transportation security or civil aviation website available to the public in the English language and include similar western-style security cultures. The sample is an abbreviated overview to demonstrate differences in government implementation of aviation cargo security measures and by no means encompasses the whole program.

  4. The lack of available information could demonstrate limiting security information available to the general public, but could also demonstrate an immature cargo security program.

  5. This research project only encompasses GPAC part one research and does not produce real suggested standards and practices. GPAC consists of three separate research areas: GPAC part one, program development and implementation, GPAC part two, the certified shipper program, and GPAC part three, shipping hubs. GPAC part two develops the GPAC certified shipper program, which enables known consignor companies to establish GPAC procedures at the supply chain’s start point, through arrival at the airport, where airline representatives receive the secured freight for loading. The GPAC certified shipper program builds efficient and globally recognized security measures using advanced screening techniques while lowering the economic impact of duplicate screening efforts between nations.

    GPAC part three establishes guidance for GPAC shipping hubs to accommodate shippers that are unable or do not want to attain GPAC certified shipper status. The GPAC shipping hubs enforce recognized security measures for non-GPAC members.

  6. Mutually recognizable security standards are defined as Member States having differing security methods and techniques, while recognizing another country’s methods provide the same level of security as their own.

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Correspondence to Sarah Moore.

Appendix: Government Implementation of Air Cargo Security Practices in Australia, Canada European Union New Zealand United Kingdom and Singapore

Appendix: Government Implementation of Air Cargo Security Practices in Australia, Canada European Union New Zealand United Kingdom and Singapore

Australia

The Australian government mandates that air cargo be cleared by security before it is loaded onto an aircraft. Businesses that clear, handle or make arrangements for the transport of air cargo apply the security measures. The Australian air cargo supply chain is regulated under the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 (Australian Government 2014). The regulations are administered under two systems: the Regulated Air Cargo Agent (RACA) and Accredited Air Cargo Agent (AACA). The RACA Scheme applies to businesses to make arrangements with airlines for the transport of air cargo, or operate a site for the purpose of storage, handling, examination or processing of air cargo (Australian Government 2014). The AACA scheme complements RACA by covering businesses that provide ground transport of cargo designated as air cargo. Of interest, the Australian Government in late 2013 asked for further work on policy options for improving air cargo security. At the time of this research, there was no further open source information on official Australian government websites about changes to the proposed improvement of the Australian air cargo security framework.

Canada

Transport Canada is responsible for transportation policies and programs and reports to Parliament and Canadians through the minister of Transport. The Canadian Air Cargo Security program promotes strengthening its security practices to bring its security to a level comparable to the practices of the United States and key trading partners (Transport Canada 2013). Canada looks to develop a program that meets the highest standards, reduces risk and keeps goods moving efficiently. The Air Cargo Security program is developing regulatory requirements for security on domestic and international all-cargo flights with expected changes to take effect in 2015 (Transport Canada 2013).

European Union

In this analysis, the European Union has the most vigorous and detailed air cargo security management process for mail and cargo comparable to the United States. In the EU, all cargo and mail must be physically screened or come from a secure supply chain prior to aircraft loading. Since the October 2010 printer cartridge incident, security requirements expanded. Air carriers delivering mail and cargo into the EU from non-EU airports must ensure they meet security standards prior to loading (European Commission, Mobility and Transport 2012). It is important to note that these rules apply to individual air carriers, not foreign states. Of particular interest, this security structure developed into the US and EU’s mutual recognition of one each other’s air cargo security functions, which became officially recognized in 2012 (European Commission, Mobility and Transport 2012). This practice positively affected the efficiency of transatlantic shipments, subsequently cutting costs and saving time in the air cargo industry (European Commission, Mobility and Transport 2012). Recognizing air cargo requirements between the US and EU eliminates the duplication of security controls while preserving security (European Commission, Mobility and Transport 2012). Mutual international recognition of security practices and is a promising step for air cargo security.

New Zealand

In New Zealand, the Civil Aviation Rules structure the aviation industry. The New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority requires an air operator to forbid cargo or mail on board an international passenger aircraft unless the cargo is received from a regulated air cargo agent certified by Civil Aviation Rules Part 109 - Regulated Air Cargo Agents (Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand 2013). The Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, Advisory Circular AC108-1, Air Operator Security Program, Rule 108.53(b)(5) outlines that: “if the identity of the shipper is not known; compliance with known customer procedures cannot be proved; the delivery is made through a third party; or the actions of the shipper arouse suspicion, then the contents will undergo manual, or combined manual and X-ray screening” (Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand 2013). New Zealand’s program relies heavily upon its known customer program for risk-based security. Information was not readily available on cargo specific security, and aviation security topics were deeply embedded in the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority’s website.

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the government is responsible for all air cargo security practices. Cargo loaded onto an aircraft undergoes screening by a regulated agent or a Known Consignor (United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority 2008). The Known Consignor Scheme is a voluntary program, where cargo dispatched from the shipper is viewed as secure cargo (United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority 2008). Cargo deemed insecure is subject to additional security measures before it can fly. The UK is currently accepting applications for pre-certification for EU independent validator status

Singapore

In 2008, Singapore implemented its Regulated Air Cargo Agent Regime (RACAR). Singapore’s Civil Aviation Authority and the country’s own Police Force work jointly on program implementation. RACAR relies on air cargo agents to register and undergo random screening of their known cargo, and security measures are carried out by the Cargo Terminal Operators when cargo arrives at the airfreight terminals (Singapore Police Force, Civil Aviation Authority 2014). Cargo not from known consignors shall be fully screened at an additional cost to the air cargo agent (Singapore Police Force, Civil Aviation Authority 2014).

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Moore, S. Closing the gaps in air cargo security. J Transp Secur 8, 115–137 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-015-0163-9

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