Abstract
Sydney Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar’s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of objects if they are to be deemed genuine rather than ‘mere-Cambridge’. The intrinsic criterion requires that all genuine properties and relations be intrinsic. Molnar’s S-property argument says that these criteria conflict if one considers extrinsic spatiotemporal properties and relations to contribute causally. In this paper, I argue that a solution to the contradiction that Molnar identifies involves a denial of discreteness between objects, leading to a power holist perspective and a resulting deflationary account of intrinsicality.
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Notes
Shoemaker’s change in 1998 was precisely to introduce properties having non-causal features, and hence his move to a moderate Pan-dispositionalism.
In his discussion on ‘circumstances’, for example, Shoemaker says that being in a certain type of relation can be spoken of as possessing a certain type of relational property (Shoemaker 1984, p. 211 ftn.). Relations between discrete objects, such as spatiotemporal relations, are mere-Cambridge, although there are also genuine relations which derive from the genuine, intrinsic properties of their relata. These genuine relations, like genuine properties, have their causal potentialities specified by (necessary) laws of nature. For Shoemaker the causal potentialities of both properties and relations are essential to them (1980b, p. 297), and correspond to a thing’s cluster of conditional powers (1984, p. 213). Genuine relations, like genuine properties, are universals; and what is true in one instance of a universal is true in every instance (1980b, pp. 301–302).
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss this point in further detail. Robert Francescotti (1999b), however, provides an excellent discussion.
Molnar’s more detailed definition is as follows:
Df7 F is an intrinsic property of a iff a’s having the property F is ontologically independent of the existence, and of the non-existence, of any contingent b such that a is wholly distinct from b; and a’s not having the property F is ontologically independent of the existence, and of the non-existence, of any contingent b such that a is wholly distinct from b.
Df8 F is an extrinsic property of a iff F is a property of a and F is not an intrinsic property of a (2003, p. 102).
Robert Francescotti’s formal definition, given as follows: F is an intrinsic property = df necessarily, for any item x, if x has F, then there are internal properties I1,…, In had by x, such that x’s having F consists in x’s having I1,…, In . (Call a property that is not a d-relational feature of item x an internal property of x.) (Francescotti 1999a, p. 608).
Further discussions on intrinsic properties and relations include that provided by David Lewis (1986a; 1999). Brian Weatherson (2001) also provides a useful resource to the debate by reviewing sources of criticism of Langton and Lewis’s account and by amending it to defend against these various criticisms.
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the nature of relations between mereological parts of a whole. Whether, for example, fingers on a hand should be considered discrete or not, will determine whether the relations between the fingers are extrinsic or intrinsic.
The terms ‘d-relational’ (i.e. relational to any distinct object) and ‘independent from’, are similar conceptually to Langton and Lewis’s use of the term ‘unaccompanied’ or ‘lonely’ to discuss objects not contingently co-existing with other (distinct) objects (1998, p. 343).
It is not within the scope of this paper to debate whether this claim equivocates on type-token issues. I suspect that it does, but will not argue for that point here. The case that I do put forward, that such properties cannot be strictly distinct and also have a place in an interrelated web, negates the relevance of the former issue.
Questions about whether the paperclip and pen both need to presently exist for the comparison to be made, whether past entities can be said to exist in some fashion or other at all, and other such issues, all unnecessarily complicate what is meant as a naïve yet comprehensible example. For the purposes of this paper, these and other questions have been parenthesised.
As noted by Leon Lederman and Christopher Hill, Noether’s Theorem (1915) observes that, for every continuous symmetry in the laws of physics, there is a corresponding conservation law and a corresponding conserved quantity (Lederman and Hill 2008, pp. 54, 73).
I owe this objection to an anonymous referee’s feedback on an earlier draft of this paper.
Although it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss further, other interesting analyses of Armstrong’s account of Laws include those put forward by Herbert Hochberg (1999, 2002), Charles Martin and Ullin Place (Crane et al. 1996), Alexander Bird (2005, 2007) and Stephen Mumford (2004, 2007).
As mentioned earlier, ‘objects’ can be thought of as systems of component parts, each of which is a further system of still more fundamental parts, and so on. Thus, the level at which we point to an object and call it discrete from another is subject to pragmatic theoretical and contextual considerations. My arm and my leg, for example, might be considered part of a single system, yet that system comprised of discrete parts. It is not, however, within the scope of this paper to provide a thorough-going analysis of objecthood. Let it therefore suffice to understand this talk of discrete objects generally, and allow that the principles of discreteness can be specified in greater detail depending upon the context under consideration.
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Ford, S.R. Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories:. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 195–215 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0104-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-012-0104-z