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Why do firms decide to stop their share repurchase programs?

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Abstract

We explore the distinguishing characteristics of firms that completed or ended share repurchase programs. Our findings help further understanding of the economic reasons for cancelling such programs. Based on a U.S. sample of 457 completed and 79 non-completed repurchase programs, we find a significant drop in systematic risk around completed buybacks. This suggests a response to deteriorating investment opportunities. In contrast, the systematic risk of non-completers decreases prior to the announcement, followed by an increase that peaks during the event period. This suggests that firms cancel their repurchase intentions when growth options move into the money.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Grullon and Michaely (2004), and Skinner (2008) on the relationship between share repurchases and dividends; Jagannathan et al. (2000), Haw et al. (2011), and Lee and Suh (2011) on the cash flow problem; and Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), Chan et al. (2004), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), Jun et al. (2009), Yook (2010), and Liang (2012) on undervaluation and signaling. We discuss this literature in more detail in Sect. 2.

  2. Managers can make investments each period to replace exhausted assets-in-place or to expand their businesses. However, the value of each investment will be somewhat uncertain because it will depend on future technological and market developments. For example, if macroeconomic conditions are unfavorable, expected future cash flows from a potential investment project (i.e., an investment opportunity) may be low, leading to a negative current net present value. However, managers can wait for better times, when expected cash flows are higher and the projected net present value is positive. When an optimally timed investment approaches, growth options move into the money and the proportion of growth in firm value increases. This leads to a concurrent increase in systematic risk. Because investments are essentially conversions of expansion options into real assets, firm risk declines immediately when managers decide to realize a project. This changes the relationship between real option value and real asset value.

  3. Note that we do not rule out the idea that firms that have cancelled their buyback programs have not purchased any shares back prior to the cancellation announcement. However, this is not important for the derivation of our hypothesis, or for interpreting our results that firms do not purchase any shares, because our aim is to analyze whether a specific motive, i.e., a change in investment opportunities, can provide a rationale for the action. It is thus important for managers to announce a definitive end to a program, and that the motive is a reevaluation of corporate funds because growth options have moved into the money. Furthermore, even if managers have purchased shares prior to a cancellation announcement, this still lends support to the free cash flow hypothesis. This is especially true for firms that experienced a deterioration in future investment opportunities prior to the initiation of a buyback program.

  4. Oswald and Young (2008) argue that the uncommitted nature of open market repurchases makes buybacks prone to the same agency problem they are believed to alleviate, simply because self-interested managers will not agree on the payout decision. Aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests, as well as large shareholders’ monitoring activities, can serve as mechanisms for reducing agency problems that are related to free cash flows and excess cash. Consequently, Oswald and Young (2008) find a positive influence of managerial ownership and the degree of monitoring by external shareholders on the probability that managers will agree to disgorge surplus cash.

  5. Other reasons recognized in the literature include capital structure adjustments (e.g., Dittmar 2000) and the presence of employee stock option programs (e.g., Kahle 2002).

  6. Corroborating evidence against the idea that buybacks are initiated to distribute excess cash flow to investors is provided by Turner et al. (2013). They find that, over the 1825–1870 period, firms did not use share buybacks to distribute corporate funds to shareholders during, i.e., times when tax rates on dividends and regulatory constraints on share buybacks were negligible.

  7. Kang et al. (2011) find that lower investment opportunities may explain higher announcement returns. Boudry et al. (2013) analyze the repurchase activity of 139 real estate investment trusts (REITs), and report that REITs with poor investment opportunities buy back more shares and have higher announcement effects.

  8. Investment opportunities can be considered as call options that are at the discretion of management (Jacquier et al. 2010).

  9. Carlson et al. (2010) and Zeidler et al. (2012) empirically address the risk dynamics surrounding seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and convertible bond offerings (CBOs). Both studies find that risk tends to increase prior to external capital increases (either by SEOs or CBOs) because of increases in the growth option leverage and optimally timed investment advances. Specifically, this evidence is consistent with the idea that managers are unable to finance potentially value-adding investment projects without raising external capital. Because investment opportunities are riskier than their underlying assets, risk increases before SEOs or CBOs because the value of the growth option portfolio increases. When it becomes optimal to raise capital, these real options are exercised, causing an immediate decline in systematic risk as real investments again change the relative importance of growth options and assets-in-place.

  10. See, e.g., Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), Chan et al. (2004), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), Jun et al. (2009), Yook (2010), Kang et al. (2011), Liang (2012), Bargeron et al. (2015), and Manconi et al. (2014).

  11. Yook (2010) offers another reason to believe that share buybacks are initiated for motives other than signaling a perceived undervaluation. He argues that it would not be feasible for firms to frequently initiate share repurchases to successfully signal their undervaluation or potential to achieve higher cash flows in the future. This is because the uncommitted nature of open market repurchases makes the announcements a rather costless signal for managers. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) provide support for this view by documenting that wealth effects are higher for infrequent repurchasers.

  12. Thomson SDC reports a total of 39,824 repurchase programs announced between January 1, 1985, and December 31, 2009. However, only 10,490 were classified as completed or cancelled.

  13. To avoid confounding effects related to prior repurchases, we use the related SDC deal numbers to identify buybacks that are related to other types of repurchases.

  14. Note that our results are robust to the specification of these upper and lower bounds.

  15. In unreported regression models, we replicate our estimations by using \(\Delta \) CapEx instead of Investments. Our results are robust to alternative specifications.

  16. In unreported tables, we also use Total Assets as a proxy for firm size within our regression analysis. Our results are robust to alternative specifications.

  17. These results remain stable when using the book value of equity instead of the market value of equity to delever equity beta.

  18. See "Appendix" for a description of the linear approximation.

  19. For example, positive announcement effects are reported by Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), Kang et al. (2011), Bargeron et al. (2015), and Manconi et al. (2014).

  20. See, e.g., Brown and Warner (1985), MacKinlay (1997), and Corrado (2011) for an overview of the event study methodology.

  21. Our results remain stable if we estimate the market model parameters from an estimation period beginning after the completion or cancellation date. Thus, our results are not affected by a change in the beta parameter. In addition, to avoid potential biases from illiquid stocks, we exclude all companies with insufficient turnover, as described in the previous section.

  22. Except for information about the aggregate U.S. dollar amount spent on purchases of common and preferred stock in their cash flow statement, U.S. firms were not required to report details of their repurchase transactions in their annual reports or other filings until March 2004. Moreover, Bonaimé (2015) notes that precise estimates of a firm’s repurchase activity is at least biased if a firm does not volunteer additional information. Kim et al. (2005) compare disclosure requirements in the U.S. with nine other large stock markets.

  23. In unreported tables, we use \(\Delta \) Investments and \(\Delta \) Investment Opportunities as explanatory variables in order to show that our results are robust to changes in the sets of independent variables. Our results remain virtually unchanged, and real option theory provides a rational explanation for the decisions to complete or end stock repurchase programs.

  24. Our long-horizon results are not affected by the beginning month, because they remain stable if we exclude announcement month returns from the analysis.

  25. To further prevent misspecifications, we follow Jegadeesh and Karceski ’s (2009) approach to control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity between CTARs. The results are in Table 16 in the online Appendix.

  26. Our results remain stable whether we use value-weighted BHARs or value-weighted CTARs.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Thomas J. Boulton, Antonio Cosma, Ron Giammarino, Shrikant Jategaonkar, Wolfgang Kürsten, Ruomeng Liu, Manuel Molterer, Dirk Schiereck, Denis Schweizer, Brian Smith, Marcel Tyrell, Theo Vermaelen, and the participants of the 11th Corporate Finance Day (Liège, 2013), 2013 World Finance & Banking Symposium (Beijing), Mid-West Finance Association 2014 Annual Meeting (Orlando), 26th Annual NFA Conference (Ottawa, 2014), 2014 Paris Financial Management Conference (PFMC 2014), Eastern Finance Association 2015 Annual Meeting (New Orleans), and Academy of Economics and Finance 53rd Annual Meeting (Pensacola Beach, 2016), and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and excellent suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper. Previous versions of this paper were titled “Investment behavior and risk dynamics: Evidence from share repurchases.”

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Appendix: Linear approximation

Appendix: Linear approximation

Because the number of calendar days between the announcement and completion or cancellation differs for every share repurchase, we apply Malmendier et al.’s (2016) linear interpolation to normalize this time interval to \(T_{S} = 250\) synthetic trading days. Specifically, we calculate normalized equity betas, \(\widehat{\beta }^{E}_{i,t_{s}}\), and normalized cumulative abnormal returns, \(\widehat{CAR}_{i,t_{s}}\), for company i for every synthetic trading day \(t_{s}\) on the basis of realized equity betas, \(\beta ^{E}_{i,t}\), and realized cumulative abnormal returns, \(CAR_{i,t}\). We then calculate realized betas and CARs for the empirical event window, \(T_{i}\), beginning at the announcement day, \(T_{A}\), and ending with the completion or cancellation day, \(T_{C/W}\). For each firm, we either condense realized beta values to our synthetic time interval if \(T_{i} \ge T_{S}\), or we extend them to \(T_{S}\) if the empirical event window has less than 250 calendar days. As per Malmendier et al. (2016), we assign the event-specific variable \(\beta ^{E}_{i,t}\) to every synthetic trading day after \({t}_{s}=t_{s}\frac{T_{i}}{T_{S}}\) days:

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\beta }^{E}_{i,t_{s}} = \beta _{i,{t}_{s}}. \end{aligned}$$
(2)

For example, if the cancellation announcement occurs 500 days after the initiation announcement, i.e., \(T_{i}=500\), then the normalized equity beta after 50 synthetic trading days, \(\widehat{\beta }^{E}_{i,50}\), will equal the realized equity beta after 100 empirical trading days, \(\beta ^{E}_{i,100}\), because \(\widehat{t}_{s}=50\frac{500}{250}=100\). However, the index that identifies the respective real trading day may not always be an integer. In that case, as per Malmendier et al. (2016), we use the following linear interpolation:

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\beta }^{E}_{i,t_{s}} =(1-\gamma _{i,t_{s}})\cdot \beta ^{E}_{i,\lfloor {t}_{s} \rfloor } + \gamma _{i,t_{s}}\cdot \beta ^{E}_{i,\lfloor {t}_{s} \rfloor +1} \end{aligned}$$
(3)

where \(\gamma _{i,t_{s}}={t}_{s}-\lfloor {t}_{s} \rfloor \), and \(\lfloor {t}_{s} \rfloor \) refer to the largest previous real number.

Thus, for a share repurchase completed 150 days after initiation, i.e., \(T_{i}=150\), the normalized equity beta after 12 synthetic trading days will be a weighted average of realized equity betas after seven and eight empirical trading days, \({\widehat\beta }^{E}_{i,12}=0.8\cdot \beta ^{E}_{i,7}+0.2\cdot\beta ^{E}_{i,8}\), because \({t_{s}} = t_{s} \frac{T_{j}}{T_{S}}= 7.2\), and \(\gamma _{i,12}= 7.2- \lfloor 7.2 \rfloor = 0.2\).

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Mietzner, M. Why do firms decide to stop their share repurchase programs? . Rev Manag Sci 11, 815–855 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-016-0206-z

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