Abstract
In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem from within the counterfactual theory of causation.
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Notes
Perhaps this is why Kim has recently introduced a version of the exclusion problem that does not rely on the principle of supervenience, but rather generates exclusionary pressures through the use of (I), (NO), (CCP) and (P-MC) alone (Kim 2005, 44). But, of course, the autonomist rejects P-MC, so she is immune to these exclusion pressures.
Or, to use a more common place example: the car at t 1 (P) casts a shadow at t 1 (M), and the movement of the car causes the location of the car at t 2 (P*) and the location of the car’s shadow at t 2 (M*). On the counterfactual model, M may be a cause of P*, since (~M < ~ P) and (~P < ~ P*), so (~M < ~ P*). But, imagine that it is cloudy out, so neither M nor M* appear though P and P* do. In this case (~M < P*), so P* is not counterfactually dependent on M, so M does not cause P*. The lesson here is that the supervenience of M on P and M* on P* does not entail that (~M < ~ P*), which means that the supervenience of M on P and M* on P* does not entail that M is a cause of P*.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Moore, D. Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong. Philosophia 41, 831–839 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9444-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9444-3