Abstract
We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in terms of causal roles, and (2) these problems are categorized as scientific or philosophical on the basis of the epistemic context of putative realizers. We argue that the first step of the strategy is necessary to avoid begging the question with regard to categorization of existence problems, and the second step categorizes existence problems on the basis of a distinction between two ways in which an entity can be elusive. This distinction between kinds of elusiveness takes as background a standard account of inference to the best explanation. Applying this strategy, we argue that the existence of a multiverse is a scientific problem.
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Notes
Although Armstrong and Lewis took these characterizations to be analyses (Armstrong 1983, pp. 50–51), they need not be taken as such, as Armstrong points out (1983, p. 69). Instead, these characterizations can be understood as core substantive claims about putative entities. Thus, while Armstrong and Lewis distinguished philosophical problems as requiring application of a priori methods, we do not. Nevertheless, we bring to the forefront another aspect of Armstrong- and Lewis-style causal role characterizations, namely their topic neutrality. Also, although Armstrong and Lewis offered causal role characterizations, their focus was on identification of the realizers of these roles with physical entities, not on the categorization of existence problems. Thus, their primary concern was with problems of constituting nature, not existence problems; we’ll discuss this distinction further in Sect. 1.2.
Despite our realist language, since both sides of the realism-antirealism debate can acknowledge a distinction between philosophical and scientific existence problems, our discussion is orthogonal to that debate. While we incline to realism, so far as we can see, our strategy for distinguishing between philosophical and scientific existence problems can be restated in anti-realist terms. So, for example, Bas van Fraassen’s (2009) objection to the use of Perrin’s early 20th century experimental work to support scientific realism is orthogonal to our concerns; van Fraassen is concerned with the realism-antirealism debate, not a categorization of historical work on atomism as philosophical or scientific.
We take claims to be expressions of beliefs, and will use ‘belief’ and ‘claim’ interchangeably.
Centrality is a graded notion—how much damage is done to a belief system through rejection of a central background belief will vary with respect the central background belief. Rejection of laws of logic would do a great deal of damage, whereas, for example, a rejection of conservation laws, or a denial that macro-level change is the result of micro-level change, would do less damage.
Given our definition of ‘non-physical’, i.e., as not describable in scientific terms, existence problems involving non-physical entities are philosophical.
See, for example, (D. M. Armstrong (1968), pp. 120–121, p. 355.)
Frank Jackson’s Mary thought experiment (1982) suggests an existence problem with respect to (not non-physical states but) non-physical properties. A compelled reason is generated: for all knowledge of what it’s like to be conscious of perceptible properties is knowledge of information which isn’t knowledge of physical information; furthermore, there is knowledge of what it is like to be conscious of perceptible properties. Therefore, there is knowledge of information which isn’t knowledge of physical information. This is a compelled reason providing significant but inconclusive evidence for there being qualia, characterized as non-physical mental properties that are what it is like to be conscious of perceptible properties. Of course, the argument along these lines has been criticized in many ways (in particular, the first claim generating the compelled reason is not central background). But the literature about this argument indicates its evidence is significant.
We assume that omnipotence and omniscience can be causally construed as involving powers that violate natural laws, and therefore are supernatural powers; furthermore, we assume that anything with supernatural powers has a non-physical constituting nature.
Lawrence Krauss (2012) seems to argue that this central belief is false. But, depending on what Krauss means by ‘nothing’, he could be arguing that our background beliefs have been so incomplete as to be misleading. Either way, we are skeptical that Krauss has made progress on the issue of why there is something rather than nothing.
Likewise, one shouldn’t simply assume that the realizer is physical. Dawkins seems to do this on the basis of thinking that everything that exists must have a scientific nature (2006, pp. 55–57). Note that on our view, even if Dawkins were correct, the physical nature of the realizer doesn’t by itself decide that the existence problem is scientific.
Larry Wright (2001) draws a distinction between tractable and intractable investigations which serves as the jumping off point for our distinction between elusiveness due to the limits of detection techniques and elusiveness due to the limits of scientific theory. Wright (personal communication) agrees that our distinction is in line with his.
There had been “indirect experimental proofs of [neutrinos’] reality” prior to 1956 (Riordan 2001, p. 4). A distinction between direct and indirect detection can be relevant to determining whether a scientific existence problem is solved, if one holds that direct detection is needed to make an entity non-elusive. If one does hold this, then one needs to distinguish between direct and indirect detection, and say why direct detection is necessary. Fortunately, our distinction between philosophical and scientific existence problems on the basis of tractable causal relations avoids these tricky issues, since both sorts of detection involve tractable causal relations.
We are leaving open that in connection with problems other than existence problems philosophy does more than work to shape them up for science.
In presenting this existence problem, we are attempting to capture an intuitive problem rather than represent a particular philosopher’s argument (however, the argument is meant to support what is called physical atomism; Chalmers 2009, pp. 31–34 distinguishes physical atomism from the version of atomism developed in response to Zeno). The central background is: change in macro-level material entities is the result of change in micro-level material entities; however, no change (at all) can be produced by infinitely small entities (since infinitely small entities do not have coherent properties relevant to producing change). Furthermore, macro-level material change exists. Therefore, macro-level material change is explained by small but not infinitely small entities. That this is the case is a compelled reason that provides significant evidence that there are finitely small underlying producers of all material change. (Of course, considerations about emergence—which would question the first premise—might not allow this argument to apply to all material change.)
Peter R. Anstey (2000, pp. 43–44, p. 54, pp. 117–118) argues that Boyle held so-called practical atomism, according to which there are physical constraints on the divisibility of matter; this version of atomism is different from atomism developed in response to Zeno.
Chalmers (2009) argues that atomism wasn’t scientific until Jean Perrin’s experiments in 1908. However, Chalmers ties scientific categorization of atomism to considerations that settle the question of the existence of atoms (2009, p. 16, p. 233, pp. 238–239). Thus, on Chalmers’s view scientific categorization is incompatible with elusiveness. Chalmers’s epistemic demands for scientific categorization seem to be driven by a realist position in the realism-antirealism debate. But we think this debate is orthogonal to the issue of distinguishing between philosophical and scientific existence problems. In the 1930s and 1940s, when neutrinos were elusive due to the limits of practical detection techniques, the existence problem was scientific because the causal relation between neutrinos and their signatures was tractable (Reines 1996, pp. 317–318). This is true whether or not neutrinos are metaphysically real according to some set of criteria.
As Carr (2007, p. 3) notes, the point being made isn’t specific to human life, but applies to life in general. In our discussion, however, we’ll make reference only to human life.
Hacking (1987) denies that this compelled reason—that our universe’s fundamental physical constants are within certain narrow ranges—provide evidence for an anthropic universe-producing entity. However, Bradley (2009) argues that Hacking arrives at this conclusion by ignoring the important role of selection effects; taking selection effects into account, the compelled reason does provide evidence for an anthropic universe-producing entity. For another objection to the idea that this compelled reason provides evidence for an anthropic universe-producing entity, see Juhl (2006); for a response to this objection, see Micah Newman (MS).
For some authors, the truism we refer to is termed the ‘anthropic principle,’ and the form of reasoning we are about to identify is ‘anthropic reasoning’ (see Weinstein 2006, pp. 1–2, for example). Susskind suggests that he uses ‘the anthropic principle’ as shorthand for anthropic reasoning (2006, p. 197). The literature is messy with regard to this terminology.
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Acknowledgments
We presented (now somewhat distant) ancestor versions of this paper to the Philosophy Department of UC Riverside, and work in progress groups at the Claremont Colleges and at Cal Poly Pomona. We thank the audiences at those events, and in particular Patrick Todd, who provided comments at UC Riverside, as well as Michael Liston and Brian McLaughlin, Larry Wright, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. We are especially grateful to Suketu Bhavsar and Michael Hatfield for helpful suggestions regarding cosmology.
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Ross, P.W., Turner, D. Existence problems in philosophy and science. Synthese 190, 4239–4259 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0270-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0270-8