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Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness

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Abstract

This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent’s narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. St. Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UJ, UK

    Tim Bayne

  2. Institut Jean-Nicod UMR 8129, CNRS-EHESS-ENS, Pavillon Jardin Ecole Normale Supérieure, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005, Paris, France

    Elisabeth Pacherie

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  1. Tim Bayne
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  2. Elisabeth Pacherie
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Correspondence to Tim Bayne.

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Bayne, T., Pacherie, E. Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness. Synthese 159, 475–491 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9239-9

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