Abstract
This paper assesses the most well thought out contemporary conception of republican liberty put forward by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. I demonstrate that it is incoherent: at least insofar as it seeks to pick out a form of unfreedom not captured by the negative conception of liberty. This incoherence arises because Pettit and Skinner cannot both hold that republican unfreedom is defined by one agent’s mere capacity to interfere arbitrarily with another agent and, at the same time, claim that republican freedom can be promoted by deterrence mechanisms. My contribution to contemporary republican theory is to suggest that a coherent republican conception can be achieved, however, through an important revision. This is to replace Pettit and Skinner’s antonym of republican liberty—the power to interfere arbitrarily—with a higher order power—the power to determine arbitrarily rules with respect to interference. This revised conception does pick out a genuinely distinct extension of unfreedom from the negative liberty conception. I believe it also reflects an important intuitive sense in which we may understand ourselves to be unfree, that is, to live under the rule of another.
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Notes
Pettit attempts to drop the language of ‘non-domination’ in favour of ‘the absence of alien control’ in Pettit (2008a) although he explicitly asserts that the new formulation ‘does not fundamentally depart’ from the old formulation (Pettit 2008a, p. 102). However, he returns to the language of ‘non-domination’ in Pettit (2012).
Skinner appears to have acquiesced to Pettit’s most recent renderings of the conception (Skinner 2008).
For a long time, Pettit has used ‘arbitrary’ to describe interference that amounts to domination. However, in his latest work he drops the term in favour of ‘uncontrolled’ interference as he believes it has ‘misleading connotations today’.
It is not entirely clear whether such controlled interference still constitutes a vitiating (but not invasive) hindrance and thus make A ‘non-free’, or in fact does not constitute a hindrance at all, and thus does not diminish A’s freedom at all. Pettit appears to indicate the latter in his summary in Pettit (2012), when he states that ‘[I]f the citizenry control the interference of the state … then that interference will not count as dominating and the state will not deprive people of freedom.’ [Italics mine] (Pettit 2012, p. 302). This is consistent with his statement in Pettit (1997), that ‘[I]nterference occurs without any loss of liberty when the interference is not arbitrary and does not represent a form of domination: when it is controlled…’ (Pettit 1997, p. 35). However, on the other hand, Pettit (1997) states that ‘[f]or the conception of freedom as non-domination, intentional interferences that are non-arbitrary are similar to natural obstacles in conditioning but not compromising freedom’ where the conditions/compromising distinction is a forerunner of the vitiating/hindrance distinction such that people are only made ‘non-free’ by conditioning factors (Pettit 1997, p. 76). This ambiguity is not resolved in Pettit (2012) as far as I can tell.
‘The nerve of the republican theory’ (Skinner 2008, p 89).
Following Steiner (1975).
Ronen Shnayderman (2012), has recently adopted a similar strategy, but attacked a different internal point within the republican theory. I think, unconvincingly. Shnayderman points out that once republicans respond to Kramer and Carter by distilling out the mere existential state of domination/alien-control as the sole antonym of republican liberty, then it can no longer explain why not merely being subject to such domination/alien-control but also actually being interfered with constitutes a greater breach of republican liberty. However, the republican appears to have a clear response to this objection. Just because the republican cannot construe actual interference, on top of domination/alien-control, as a further loss of republican liberty, this does not prevent the republican from framing actual interference as a further ‘bad’. The republican may even be willing to register this bad as a type of liberty, albeit, as a loss of ‘negative’ liberty. All the republican need ultimately do to vindicate their position is to explain why the loss of republican liberty remains as the bad of primary normative significance. And, this is quite plausibly done by simply pointing out that it is the very sine non qua of actual interference. When looking at an instance of actual interference, the republican can plausibly contend that the ultimate bad was not merely that the interference did happen, but that it could have happened in the first place. As Pettit states in his latest work, ‘Freedom in this [republican] sense is not meant to be the only value in life, or the only value that matters. The claim is merely that it is a gateway good…’ (Shnayderman 2012, p. 3). Thus conversely, we might say ‘Unfreedom in the republican sense is not meant to be the only bad in life, or the only bad that matters. The claim is merely that is a “gateway bad.”’
This is absolutely explicit in (Pettit 1997, p. 67; Pettit 2008b, p. 219). In Skinner’s case it can be inferred: first, from his claims that unfreedom is the result of rulers interfering arbitrarily in the lives of their subjects ‘with impunity’ (Skinner 2006, pp. 251, 245; Skinner 1998 p. 72); and secondly, that he clearly expects the liberty of those subjects to be expanded by the securing and protection of ‘basic liberties’ by systems of law depending upon deterrence (Skinner 1998, pp. 44–45; pp. 65–72).
I am thankful to my anonymous referees for these ripostes.
Gaus (2003, pp. 70–73) makes a similar point (to which I cannot find a response by either Pettit or Skinner). However, Gaus relies upon the implication being implausible rather than noting the incoherence it creates for the republican conception as a whole. Further, of course, Gaus simply takes it to undermine the republican conception rather than prompt the revision I suggest.
Or, at least, not in an arbitrary manner. She may be able to change them in a non-arbitrary manner through the democratic process, for example.
For ownership as a ‘bundle of rights’, see further, Honoré (1961).
Technically, our account of the reason that a putatively authoritative direction gives a subject has to be far more complicated but these complications are irrelevant to this essay. However, for a discussion of these issues, see further, Enoch (2014).
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Kirby, N. Revising Republican Liberty: What is the Difference Between a Disinterested Gentle Giant and a Deterred Criminal?. Res Publica 22, 369–386 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-015-9277-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-015-9277-y