Abstract
John Christman has recently objected to substantive conceptions of autonomy on the grounds that they introduce unwanted perfectionism into political thinking. I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy against Christman’s critique on two fronts. First, I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy against the charge that their utilisation in political theory would result in the inappropriate exclusion from democratic respect of individuals in oppressive relations. Second, I defend substantive conceptions of autonomy from the charge that they fail the ‘endorsement constraint’, i.e. that incorporating a substantive conception of autonomy into the concept of the person at the heart of a political theory would be alienating for citizens.
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Notes
This is not to say that I contest the broader claims Christman (2009) develops, such as his socio-historical model of the self, or his vision of democratic justice. Neither should it be taken as a defence of substantive theories of autonomy per se. My goal in this paper is solely to show that Christman’s arguments for rejecting substantive theories of autonomy are unsuccessful.
Christman does not engage with the recent suggestion by Benson (2005) that a middle way can be found through ‘weakly substantive’ views. Since such views still incorporate restrictions on the content of an agent’s beliefs or values, I will be assuming that Christman would object to such views on the same grounds as for strongly substantive accounts.
It may be noted that the overarching problem of excluding non-autonomous persons from the political realm will remain despite with this solution. This is the kind of objection that Nussbaum (2006) has raised against social contract theories in general, with respect to the severely disabled. Such problems are beyond the scope of this paper.
Specifying which social conditions compromise autonomy will inevitably be a controversial undertaking, as will the related task of determining an appropriate political response to those conditions. For liberals of all stripes, there will be a justificatory gap between identifying a practice as autonomy-undermining and restricting that practice.
I discuss a similar problem, and suggest a similar solution, with respect to the concept of dignity (see Killmister 2010). Thanks to Sally Haslanger for useful discussion on this point.
Mackenzie (2008, p. 523) makes a similar observation regarding the inevitability of exclusion on Christman’s own account. Indeed, it is plausible that the exclusions required by Christman’s account will be even more substantial than those required by some substantive accounts. According to Christman (2005a, pp. 348–349), a citizen cannot make a value claim as part of the deliberative process unless that claim meets two conditions: (1) there is an inferential relationship between the value and the agent’s other beliefs and values; (2) those values are expressed consistently. Compared, say, to Paul Benson’s recent condition that the agent take herself to be authorised to speak for her actions, Christman’s account appears significantly more stringent, and would thus exclude more individuals from the deliberative process.
Dianna Meyers (1989) was influential in bringing about this shift in perspective.
It is important not to follow the common assumption that proceduralist theories as a rule are less demanding than substantive theories. For a convincing rebuttal of this assumption, see Schwartz (2005).
One further point is worth stressing. In this paper I defend substantive accounts of autonomy such as Stoljar’s and Oshana’s from Christman’s objections. This should not be taken to mean that I believe such conceptions to be the best accounts of autonomy available, or even that such conceptions are ultimately compatible with political liberalism. What I seek do here is simply show that Christman’s objection do not suffice to rule out substantive accounts, as a class, from the perspective of political liberalism.
It should be stressed here that this reflexive use of legitimacy is not necessarily shared by other political liberals. Legitimacy could also be justified in terms of respect for persons, where that is taken to be a value that is prior to (and justifies) the search for overlapping consensus, rather than being subject to overlapping consensus. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for this journal for pushing me on this point.
As an anonymous reviewer for this journal has pointed out, Christman’s version of political liberalism is not necessarily shared by others who adopt this label.
Estlund (1998) makes a similar point with respect to Rawls’ use of the reasonable.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thanktwo anonymous referees for this journal, as well as participants in the Workshop on Gender and Philosophy at MIT, and the Mentoring Project at UMass, for helpful feedback on earlier drafts.
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Killmister, S. Autonomy, Liberalism, and Anti-Perfectionism. Res Publica 19, 353–369 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-013-9229-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-013-9229-3