Abstract
It is argued that neither contextualism nor relativism can provide a satisfying semantics of knowledge ascriptions. According to contextualism, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows that p” vary with the epistemic standards operative in the contexts of utterance. These epistemic standards are determined, in particular, by the speaker’s stakes with regard to p or the consideration of error-possibilities. It is shown that the absolute concept of utterance truth together with a knowledge rule of assertion lead to certain unassertable truths in contextualism and to counterintuitive results with regard to certain cross-context knowledge ascriptions. Although utterance truth is relativized to contexts of assessment in relativist accounts of knowledge, relativism still makes inadequate semantic predictions. In particular, relativism runs into problems in cases where the context of assessment is lower than the context of utterance. It is finally argued that invariantist accounts, according to which the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions do neither vary with the context of utterance nor the context of assessment, but are determined by objective features given in the situation in which the knowledge claim is made, are better suited for modelling the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. Besides the fact that stakes or the consideration of error-possibilities can have an influence on the belief in a proposition, they have no further bearing on the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions.
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Notes
It should be kept in mind that contextualism (as well as MacFarlane’s relativism which will be discussed below) is a semantic theory about the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions. Therefore, in discussing contextualism (and relativism), metalinguistic talk should be used. Instead of saying that S knows (or does not know) that p, contextualists (and relativists) rather claim that an utterance of a sentence of the form “S knows that p” is true (or false) in a certain context. In this paper, I use metalinguistic language most of the time, in particular, when main theses and principles are defined. Where metalinguistic talk is being dropped, it is only due to practical reasons of convenience and better readability.
See, for example, DeRose’s much-discussed “bank cases” in DeRose (1992, p. 913).
I will focus on indexical versions of contextualism and leave the less popular non-indexical accounts of knowledge aside. Non-indexical contextualism [see, for example, Kompa (2002) and MacFarlane (2009)] is the slightly different view that knowledge ascriptions are use-sensitive without being use-indexical, i.e., the proposition expressed by “S knows that p” is invariant across contexts of use cU, but its truth value nevertheless varies with the epistemic standards operative in cU.
If, for example, Anna claims “I am tired”, then Bertha cannot indirectly quote this utterance by claiming: “Anna said that I am tired.” The indexical “I” always refers to the speaker of the utterance. But this seems to be different with regard to “know”: assume that Anna claims “I know that I have hands.” Furthermore, assume that Bertha is a radical skeptic and uses the verb “know” with extremely high standards, such that, according to contextualism, all (positive) knowledge ascriptions about empirical propositions are false in the high standards of her context. Nevertheless, it seems that Bertha can indirectly quote Anna’s utterance by claiming: “Anna said that she knows that she has hands.” In contrast to the first example, the occurrence of “know” in Bertha’s utterance refers to Anna’s (ordinary standards) context.
Robert Stainton, for example, argues that there are many other expressions that are subject to degrees but not gradable. Consider, for example, the term “vegetarian”: “John is vegetarian” can mean that John does not eat red meat, or that he does not eat meat or fish, or that he does not eat any animal products, etc. (see Stainton 2010, p. 152).
Whether a knowledge rule of assertion is a generally valid principle for contextualism is a disputed matter [see, for example, Jäger (2012)]. I do not want to go into this debate here, but would like to point out that the arguments against contextualist semantics presented in this paper only make use of instances of CKA that seem to be beyond reproach. For example, the proof of (vi) shows that it is a necessary consequence of contextualism that “Kb(i)” cannot be truly uttered in cU(b) H (under the assumption that “Kbp” uttered in cU(b) H is false); the proof of this unknowability of (i) only utilized uncontestable contextualist principles (such as FK and CDI). Therefore, it seems to be highly plausible to conclude that it would be incorrect for Bertha to assert in cU(b) H a sentence which is principally unknown for her in cU(b) H (under the given assumption).
John Hawthorne makes a similar point in claiming that there is a strong “inclination to reckon ourselves more enlightened with regard to our former self (on the topic of knowledge) when possibilities of error become salient” (Hawthorne 2004, p. 106, fn. 122).
Analogous to (vii), it can, of course, also be shown that given (ii)*, “Ka(i)*” uttered in cU(a) H is false, relative to cA(a) H. So (i)* remains an unknowable and unassertable truth for Anna if uttered and assessed in a high standards context of assessment.
For a similar point, see, for example, Bach (2005, p. 85).
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Brendel, E. Contextualism, relativism, and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. Philos Stud 168, 101–117 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0204-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0204-9