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Conditional assertion, denial, and supposition as illocutionary acts

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  1. Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, University at Buffalo, SUNY Buffalo, NY, 14260, USA

    John T. Kearns

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  1. John T. Kearns
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Kearns, J.T. Conditional assertion, denial, and supposition as illocutionary acts. Linguistics & Philosophy 29, 455–485 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-006-0007-y

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