Abstract
Postphenomenology, in a complementary role with other science studies disciplines, remains within the trajectory of those theories which reject early modern epistemology and metaphysics, including rejection of ‘subject’–‘object’ distinctions, and holds, instead, to an inter-relational, co-constitutive ontology. Here the critiques which sometimes echo vestiges of such early modern epistemology are counter-challenged.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Friis, J. K. B. O. (2011). Perception: Embodiment and beyond. Foundations of Science. doi:10.1007/s10699-011-9242-y.
Ihde, D. (2011). Strecthing the in-between: Embodiment and beyond. Foundations of Science, 16(2–3), 109–118.
Olesen, F. (2011). Scientific objectivity and postphenomenological perception. Foundations of Science. doi:10.1007/s10699-011-9241-z.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ihde, D. ‘Cartesianism’ Redux or Situated Knowledges. Found Sci 17, 369–372 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9243-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9243-x