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Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs

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Abstract

In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are necessary and sufficient for the impossibility of “agreeing to disagree” on the values of posterior capacities as well as on the values of posterior Choquet expectations for binary acts. Furthermore, we show that generalizations of this result to more general acts are impossible.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 3122 Pamplin Hall (0316), Blacksburg, VA, 24061, USA

    Adam Dominiak

  2. Université Paris-Dauphine, LEDa Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75 775, Paris Cedex 16, France

    Jean-Philippe Lefort

Authors
  1. Adam Dominiak
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  2. Jean-Philippe Lefort
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Correspondence to Adam Dominiak.

Additional information

The authors wish to thank Júrgen Eichberger, Konrad Grabiszewski, Nicholas Yannelis, Wendelin Schnedler and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments.

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Dominiak, A., Lefort, JP. Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs. Econ Theory 52, 1–13 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0678-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0678-7

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