Abstract
In traversing the expanse that leads from the implacable rigour of logical-rational explanation to the empathetic-intuitive understanding of Being, Heidegger not only outlines a speculative and historiographic itinerary within the confines of modern philosophy, but he also constructs a model of cosmological interpretation with which contemporary theory necessarily has to grapple. His profound excavation around the forms of reason enables Heidegger to come up with a philosophical hybrid, which is all the more disquieting in that it proves to be able to undermine the methodological certainty emanating from the causalistic version of the principle of reason. The image of the hybrid helps to clarify the nature of Heidegger’s result: it is rooted in the ground of tradition, deconstructing it and pushing it forward into the abyss of Being, into that abyss that Kant had glimpsed but from which he drew back in horror. This result therefore absorbs metaphysics and reshapes it, taking away its representative and logical content, and even creating an opposing front, another philosophical horizon. We may imagine this process of genetic mutation by means of a metaphor drawn from the human organism. The organ par excellence where reason resides is the brain, or in a broad sense the intellect. Ever since Greek times voûs has been considered the centre of mental activity and the place where thought is rationally co-ordinated.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
HGA 5, p. 335.
GD, p. 39.
Ibid., p. 37.
VA, p. 130.
M. Heidegger, Zeichen, in HGA 13, p. 211.
G, p. 15. For the expression “thought sub specie machinae”, cf. A. Baruzzi, Mensch und Maschine, Fink, München 1973, pp. 173ff.
Gadamer relates that he “constantly had in mind” this transformation while he was developing his own hermeneutical philosophy; cf. H.G. Gadamer, Gibt es auf Erden ein Maß ?, “Philosophische Rundschau”, 4, 1984, p. 175.
For a complete formulation of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, see H.G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Mohr, Tübingen 1960.
HGA 55, p. 89.
HGA 48, pp. 313–314.
HGA 55, pp. 384–385. For a comparison between Heidegger and Leibniz on the probem of technology, cf. A. Robinet, Leibniz und Heidegger: Atomzeitalter oder Informatikzeitalter?, “Studia Leibnitiana”, VIII/2, 1976, pp. 241–256.
HGA 55, p. 385. On the problem of the will, cf. also N II, pp. 96, 235ff., 300ff., 342ff., 436, 467; SG, p. 115.
HGA 45, p. 216. The term here translated as “reversal” also means “overthrowing” (Umwälzung) and is a clear reference to Marx and his concept of the overthrowing of praxis; but since we are here dealing with a lecture of 1937–38, it seems to be a reference to the ineffectiveness and negativity of the Nazi upheaval in Europe.
N II, p. 25.
GPh VI, p. 346.
Cf. A. Robinet, Le défi cybernétique, Gallimard, Paris 1973. The application of computerized techniques would, in Robinet’s opinion, make a great contribution to philosophy, not only as regards the systematization and lexicographical study of texts, but also as an impulse for a transformation of philosophical thought itself.
Cf. also A. Robinet, Architectonique disjonctive, automates systématiques et idéalité transcendantale dans l’oeuvre de G.W. Leibniz, Vrin, Paris 1986.
W. Janke, Leibniz als Metaphysiker, in W. Totok, C. Haase (eds.), Leibniz. Sein Leben-Sein Wirken-Seine Welt, Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hannover 1970, p. 385.
GPh II, p. 206.
VA, p. 179.
G.W. Leibniz, Collectanea Etymologica, cit., p. 155.
Ibid., pp. 178–179.
D. Heins, Pindari Phytiis praemissa: in qua ostenditur, quomodo veteres Philosophi Poetarum scriptis sint usi, in Heins, Orationum editio nova, prioribus auctior, Ex officina Elzeviriana, Amstelodami 1657, p. 371.
BB, p. 191. Sometimes Leibniz shows an appreciation of contemporary or past mystics, recognizing in them an authentically philosophical and genuinely religious core (“I believe that there are very fine thoughts in these extraordinary theologians, such as Schwenefeld, Weigelius, Böhme. [...] They help to lead men to a solid piety, in lieu of ordinary piety, which is often ceremonious, that is to say, false”: letter to Q. Kuhlmann of 3rd April, 1696, in BH, p. 24). Cf. the treatise Von der wahren Theologia mystica, in DS I, pp. 410ff. On other occasions, however, he was particularly critical of them: “the princess Elizabeth of Hervorde told me she held in great esteem the Christian conversations of Father [Malebranche], but that was at a time when she was beginning not to despise the writings of Jacob Böhme; this should be said, however, without making any comparison between that Father and this cobbler” (cf. Ak VI, I, p. 548). In the final analysis, we could accept Mahnke’s interpretation, according to which Leibniz rationalized the mystical impulse, without ever completely abandoning it: cf. D. Mahnke, Die Rationalisierung der Mystik bei Leibniz und Kant, “Blätter für deutsche Philosophie”, 13, 1939–40, pp. 1–73.
On this matter, see J. Baruzi, Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre, Alcan, Paris 1907
and the essay by E. Colorni, Leibnize il misticismo, in Colorni, Scritti, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1975, pp. 70–98.
In trying to clarify his concept of reason, Leibniz states that by the expression “REASON I do not here mean the opinions and discourses of men, and not even the habit that they have acquired of judging of things following the ordinary course of nature, but the inviolable concatenation of truths” (GPh VI, p. 64). Reason is certainly the starting and ending point of monadology, as we can see from these words: “Ratio ultima rerum, seu Harmonia universalis, id est Deus” (GPh I, p. 61). It is just a question of not giving too narrow and one-sided an interpretation of it. Cf. the study by K.E. Kaehler, Leibniz’ Position der Ra ti ona lität, Alber, Freiburg-München 1989.
A. Robinet, Leibniz et la racine de l’existence, cit., p. 67. Robinet here compares reason and the abyss: “the reason of being is a dizzying reason and freedom is a labyrinth” (ibid.) .
Ak II, pp. 491–493.
G.W. Leibniz, Letter of autumn 1679 to Duke Johann Friedrich, in Ak, II, I, p. 490.
Ibid.
On the logic and founding of Dasein, see Heidegger’s reflections in Beiträge zur Philosophie, HGA 65, pp. 293ff.; 159–169 (on Leibniz, p. 308), and the 1923 course, HGA 63. For a hypothesis of comparison in terms of facticity and sensitiveness, which involves also Aristotle and Husserl, see F. Volpi, Heideggere Aristotele, Daphne, Padova 1984, pp. 75ff.
HGA 13, p. 33.
On this subject see the study by M. Zarader, Heidegger et les paroles de l’origine, Vrin, Paris 1986.
HGA 13, p. 150.
GD, pp. 38–40.
Heidegger suggestively defines Gestell as “the photographic negative of Ereignis” (Seminar in Le Thor 1969, in HGA 15, p. 366). On Gestell and Ereignis, cf. HGA 65, pp. 254ff.; 470ff. Of the abundant literature on the question of technology in Heidegger, see F.W. von Herrmann, Technik und Kunst im seynsgeschichtlichen Fragehorizont, in Kunst und Technik, Gedächtnisschrift zum 100. Geburtstag von Martin Heidegger, edited by W. Biemel and F.W. von Herrmann, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, pp. 25–46;
W. Schirmacher, Technik und Gelassenheit, Alber, Freiburg-Munchen 1983;
G. Seubold, Heideggers Analyse der neuzeitlichen Technik, Alber, Freiburg- München 1986;
M. Ruggenini, Il soggetto e la tecnica, Bulzoni, Roma 1977.
WPh, p. 28.
M. Heidegger, Fragen nach dem Aufenthalt des Menschen, in “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” of 5th October, 1969, quoted in W. Strolz, Heidegger als meditativer Denker, Erker-Verlag, St. Galen 1974, p. 26.
HGA 39, pp. 237–238. The other courses on Hölderlin were published in HGA 52 and HGA 53. See also the collection of essays in HGA 4.
WPh, p. 27.
GD, p. 41.
G, p. 23.
The hypotheses of reformulation of the rational paradigm mentioned here (and these are only a few examples) refer to E. Berti, Le vie della ragione, Il Mulino, Bologna 1987;
P.K. Feyerabend, Dialogo sul metodo, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1989;
I. Prigogine, Dall’essere al divenire, Einaudi, Torino 1986;
G. Vattimo, Le avventure della differenza, cit., and Id., La fine della modernità, Garzanti, Milano 1985.
For a critic is m of many of the current “crises” of reason, but in particular of Heidegger and post Heideggerian thought, cf. the recent book by P. Rossi, Paragone degli ingegni modernie postmoderni, Il Mulino, Bologna 1989.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cristin, R. (1998). The Path: From the Principle of Reason to Meditating Thought. In: Heidegger and Leibniz. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9032-7_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9032-7_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5055-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-015-9032-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive