Abstract
There have been considerable discussions recently concerning the nature and the various types of transcendental arguments. I do not propose to rehearse the results of these discussions but instead will confine myself to Kant’s own version or, rather: versions, of a transcendental approach. For as we shall see, the first thing to highlight—something that has not perhaps received enough notice—is that even when leaving out of account Kant’s moral philosophy, he himself already employs different types of transcendental arguments, with differences that may be characterized as ‘differences in comparative logical tightness’; leaving open for the moment the question whether this is a quantitative rather than a qualitative notion; or whether any kind of ‘deficiency’ attaches to one or the other of the arguments involved.
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Buchdahl, G. (1986). Kant’s ‘Special Metaphysics’ and The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science . In: Butts, R.E. (eds) Kant’s Philosophy of Physical Science. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4730-6_5
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