Skip to main content

The Academic Contract: From “Simply a Metaphor” to Technology

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Transformations in Research, Higher Education and the Academic Market

Part of the book series: Higher Education Dynamics ((HEDY,volume 39))

  • 1705 Accesses

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the ontological assumptions that underlie the idea of a contract in Academic Capitalism. Far from being “simply a metaphor”, there are now concrete examples of real contracts in Swedish universities, which we here designate “academic contracts”. In investigating the perceived function of academic contracts, we will try to answer this fundamental question: For which problem, in what conception, is signing a contract between a student and an academic teacher a solution? By analysing four existing academic contracts from Swedish universities through the lens of a very influential economic theory of the nature and function of contracts, New Institutional Economics (NIE), we will argue that the implementation of academic contracts is totally at odds with the Humboldtian tradition and the classic university. Our contention is that the introduction of academic contracts does not facilitate, but rather undermines, the academic teaching and learning process.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    All translations from Swedish original into English are by the authors of this chapter.

  2. 2.

    For exposés and definitions of NIE, see, for example, Eggertsson (1990); Furubotn and Richter (1997).

  3. 3.

    Ankarloo’s PhD thesis forms a critique of New Institutional Economics. For concise summaries of the foundations of this critique, see Ankarloo (2002); Ankarloo and Palermo (2004).

  4. 4.

    See, for example, Williamson (1985: 16): “[Transaction cost economics] applies to the study of economic organizations of all kinds” or Barzel (1989: 98–99): “The property rights approach applies to all human behaviour and all human institutions”.

  5. 5.

    For general overviews of New Public Management concerning Sweden, see Almqvist (2006), Hasselbladh et al. (2008) and Christensen et al. (2005).

  6. 6.

    The necessity of “opportunism” in explaining the firm (labour contract) has been questioned. For critiques of Williamson in this regard, see Hodgson (2004); Love (2010).

  7. 7.

    The “shirking” explanation of the firm in NIE is associated with Alchian & Demsetz (1972). In their view the firm arises when “/…/ it is difficult to restrict shirking through simple market exchange between contracting inputs” (1972: 783, emphasis added).

  8. 8.

    Cf. “Transaction cost analysis /…/ is appropriate for studying the frictions in the system which may prevent the implications of received micro-theory from going through” (Williamson 1974: 1495).

  9. 9.

    See Williamson (1985: 90): “/…/choice between firm and market thus turns entirely on governance cost difference”.

  10. 10.

    A property right is defined as the right (a) to use, (b) to derive an income from and (c) to exchange an asset (Furubotn and Richter 1991: 6).

  11. 11.

    “A theory of the state is essential because it is the state that specifies the property rights structure” (North 1981: 17).

References

  • Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777–795.

    Google Scholar 

  • Almqvist, R. (2006). New public management – om konkurrenssättning, kontrakt och kontroll. Malmö: Liber.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ankarloo, D. (2002). New institutional economics and economic history. Capital & Class, 78, 9–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ankarloo, D., & Friberg, T. (2012). Den högre utbildningen – ett fält av marknad och politik. Möklinta: Gidlunds förlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ankarloo, D., & Palermo, G. (2004). Anti-Williamson: A Marxian critique of new institutional economics. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28, 413–429.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barzel, Y. (1989). Economic analysis of property rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cheung, S. N. S. (1983). The contractual nature of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(1), 1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cheung, S. N. S. (1992). On the new institutional economics. In H. Wijkander & L. Werin (Eds.), Contract economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., Roness, P. G., & Røvik, K. A. (2005). Organisationsteori för offentlig sektor. Malmö: Liber.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4, 386–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dahlman, C. J. (1979). The problem of externality. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(1), 141–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eggertsson, T. (1990). Economic behaviour and institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • European Commission, Educating & Training (2012). Strategic framework for education and training. http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/doc28_en.htm. Accessed 10 Jan 2012.

  • Fine, B., & Milonakis, D. (2009). From economics imperialism to freakonomics. London/New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friberg, T. (2012). Akademiska subjekt och politisk-ekonomiska processer. In: Den högre utbildningen – ett fält av marknad och politik. Möklinta: Gidlunds förlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (1991). The new institutional economics: An assessment. In E. G. Furubotn & R. Richter (Eds.), The New institutional economics. College Station: Texas A & M University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (1997). Institutions and economic theory: The contribution of the new institutional economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hasselbladh, H., Bejerot, E., & Gustafsson, R. Å. (2008). Bortom new public management: institutionell transformation i svensk sjukvård. Lund: Academia adacta.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson, G. M. (2004). Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: Why an explanatory emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(2), 401–418.

    Google Scholar 

  • Högskoleverket. (2009:16R). Förkunskap och krav i högre utbildning. Stockholm: Högskoleverket.

    Google Scholar 

  • Love, J. H. (2010). Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 166(3), 479–501.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malmö högskola. (2007). Studiehandledning omvårdnadshandledning inom sjuksköterskeprogrammet. www.mah.se/upload/_upload/studiehandledning%20omv.handl.%20070108.pdf. Accessed 3 Mar 2008.

  • Mirowski, P. (2011). Science-mart: Privatizing American science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • North, D. C. (1981). Structure and change in economic history. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D. C. (1989). A transaction cost approach to the historical development of polities and economies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 145, 661–668.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rider, S. (2009). The future of the European university: Liberal democracy or authoritarian capitalism? Culture Unbound, 1, 83–104.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L. (1997). Academic capitalism: Politics, policies, and the entrepreneurial university. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stockholms universitet. (2003). Varför skriva uppsats?. Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för folkhälsovetenskap. http://courses.ki.se/utbildningsprogram/Folkhalsovet­enskap/termin_4/FHVD01/filarkiv/uppsatskurs20p4.pdf. Accessed 3 Mar 2008.

  • Stockholms universitet. (2007). Examensarbete, PM för studenter i Teologiska programmet. Stockholm: Teologiska högskolan. http://www.ths.se/site/images/stories/Studentinformation/examensarbete_pm_for_studenter_.pdf. Accessed 3 Mar 2008.

  • Tsoukas, H. (1997). The tyranny of light: The temptations and the paradoxes of the information society. Futures, 29(9), 827–843.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uppsala universitet. (2004). Examensarbete i datavetenskap vid Uppsala universitet: Utförande, redovisning och bedömning. Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för informationsteknologi. http://www.it.uu.se/edu/exjobb/csd-before-2004/exjobb-pm.shtml. Accessed 3 Mar 2008.

  • Williamson, O. E. (1974). The economics of anti-trust: Transaction cost considerations. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 126(6), 1439–1496.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniel Ankarloo Ph.D. .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ankarloo, D., Friberg, T. (2013). The Academic Contract: From “Simply a Metaphor” to Technology. In: Rider, S., Hasselberg, Y., Waluszewski, A. (eds) Transformations in Research, Higher Education and the Academic Market. Higher Education Dynamics, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5249-8_13

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics