Abstract
In Part II of this book, we saw that Hume thinks that we always imagine ideas of objects that admit of perfect identity—by way of transcendental causation. However, while explaining the “philosopher’s” position in 1.4.2, Hume claims that we only imagine causes in reaction to the vulgar, where we do not employ transcendental causation. In this chapter, we examine the philosophical position in detail. In Sect. 1, I explain why vulgar perspective II falls apart—at the hands of the philosophers. In Sect. 2, I explain why the philosophers think that it is reasonable to think that mind-independent objects exist. In Sect. 3, I explain why Hume thought the philosophers were mistaken.
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Notes
- 1.
Recall that Hume’s entire four-part system concerns the imagined properties of invariability and uninterruptedness. However, why Hume makes the move back to the imagined properties of continuity and distinctness is never explained by Hume.
- 2.
The formal version of the reductio that the philosophers appear to be employing here may be simply understood as: If p ⊢~p, then ⊢~p.
References
Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature (2nd ed.), (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press; abbreviated as SBN.
Hume, D. (2002). A treatise of human nature (D. F Norton & M. J. Norton ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press; abbreviated as T.
Smith, N. K. (1941). The philosophy of David Hume; a critical study of its origins and central doctrines. New York: Macmillan.
Stroud, B. (1977). Hume. New York: Routledge.
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Rocknak, S. (2013). The Philosopher’s Reaction to the Vulgar: Imagined Causes Revisited. In: Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6_9
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