Abstract
The pragma-dialectical multiple-co-ordinatively compound distinction is not the same as the linked-convergent distinction. Multiple argumentation consists of a series of independent arguments each intended to be sufficient to justify accepting or rejecting some viewpoint. In co-ordinatively compound argumentation, the arguments are only sufficient together. In a critical discussion, the proponent may present a number of arguments for his viewpoint, because he must withdraw some during the course of the discussion or because he seeks to convince a plurality of challengers and trusts that each challenger will find at least one argument acceptable. The unit of dialectical analysis is the entire discussion, while the unit of logical analysis is the individual argument. The linked-convergent distinction, then, applies to co-ordinatively compound arguments and is required for the proper logical evaluation of arguments. If one convergent premise is unacceptable, the remaining premises may still be acceptable and adequate grounds for the conclusion. But if a linked premise is unacceptable, the entire reason of which it is a factor is unacceptable. Keeping these two pairs of distinctions separate can help resolve conflicts in accounts of making the linked-convergent distinction. We apply this to discussions by Thomas, Nolt, and Yanal. We argue that what Walton calls the Suspension/Insufficient Proof Test characterizes co-ordinatively compound structure rather than linked structure. We conclude the chapter by arguing that dialectics and logic will have different perspectives on modalities, rebuttals, and counter-rebuttals. Dialectics is concerned with whether the force of commitment indicated by a modality is justified; logic with whether the strength of the connection claimed between premises and conclusion actually holds. Logic requires recognizing that arguments may involve a dialectical tier containing defeaters and counter-rebuttals. Dialectics can represent the counter-rebuttal as a premise additional to those of the core argument in a co-ordinatively compound argument.
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Notes
- 1.
This is how we regarded the distinction in (1991). See p. 262. In 1996, Walton indicates that he understands the two pairs of terms as drawing the same distinction. See pp. 81, 157.
- 2.
We shall comment on the significance of “conclusive” shortly.
- 3.
We wish to thank an anonymous referee of Argumentation for pointing this out to us.
- 4.
We have treated here only the argumentation scheme for symptomatic arguments or arguments from concomitance, one of the three principal argumentation schemes van Eemeren and Grootendorst identify. Similar remarks apply to the other two argumentation schemes, arguments based on a relation of similarity or causality. (See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 96–102).) To develop this however would take us beyond the scope of this chapter.
- 5.
Snoeck Henkemans recognizes this in (1992). See p. 68 in particular. However, she says that she does not regard linked arguments–at least those where major and minor premises are linked–as being complex, but rather instance simple argumentation. Hence, she would not agree that the linked-convergent distinction as I am describing it is a distinction within complex arguments. This indicates to me that her use of “argument” ordinarily understood to correspond with “premise” as used by North American scholars, better corresponds with “reason.” A reason may be expressed by one statement or be broken over several statements intended to be taken together. In the latter case, we have linked structure. This may also reflect disciplinary perspective. For a dialectical appraisal, the question of acceptability may be conceived to arise just in connection with reasons. For a logical appraisal, it arises for premises. As we shall see in Chapter Six, being able to ask whether an individual premise is acceptable can in some cases greatly increase our efficiency in argument evaluation. If several premises constitute one reason, the entire reason is unacceptable if one of its component premises is unacceptable. (See pp. 170–171.) It is especially important to be able to group premises into reasons for arguments with a mixed convergent-linked structure. Several reasons may converge on a conclusion, but some may be expressed by individual premises and others by several premises linked together. Where premises are a unit of argument analysis, I do not see how we could represent this fact without the linked-convergent distinction.
- 6.
This and the following example are subarguments of an argument Nolt considers on p. 33 of (1984).
- 7.
Yanal present the details of his method for computing the ordinary sum of the weights of several premises in (1991). The details of this and their evaluation are beyond the scope of this chapter.
- 8.
Almost all of the material in this chapter is included in my (2001). I wish to thank referees of Argumentation for helpful comments on an earlier version of that paper.
- 9.
- 10.
We wish to thank an anonymous referee for Springer for calling out attention to Toulmin’s discussion of this point.
- 11.
Snoeck Henkemans distinguishes between co-ordinatively compound arguments where one argument (premise) gives additional information to directly support the conclusion from those where the subsequent argument counters some defeater. The former are cumulative and the latter complementary. Diagrammatically, the arguments (premises) in cumulative argumentation are connected with a “+,” while those in complementary argumentation are linked with an “&.” So the argumentation from (2) and (3ʹ) to (1) is complementary in addition to being co-ordinatively compound.
References
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Freeman, J.B. (2011). Argument Structure and Disciplinary Perspective: The Linked-Convergent Versus Multiple-Co-ordinatively Compound Distinctions. In: Argument Structure:. Argumentation Library, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0357-5_5
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