Abstract
The notions of difference and diversity have been recognised as important, but the underlying philosophical characteristics of these notions do not always receive sufficient scrutiny. An attempt to broaden the discussion is made here from the perspective of a critical theory of complexity informed by deconstruction. In structuralist and post-structuralist theories of language, difference is the source of meaning. Similarly, in complex systems, difference is responsible for the structural characteristics of such systems. It is argued that the play of difference can nevertheless not generate meaning if differences reverberate infinitely. Meaning only comes to be under bounded conditions, even though these constraints and the resultant meaning are in constant transformation. There has to be a certain “economy of difference”. Furthermore, we cannot use the notion of difference without reference to the notion of identity. Yet, identity does not determine difference, it is produced by it. Complex systems and their components are constituted through the constrained play of difference, which makes difference a resource to be cherished, not a problem to be solved. Some of the implications of acknowledging the importance of difference for our understanding of organisations are discussed.
This chapter also appeared in a special edition of Philosophy Today (Spring 2010).
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Notes
- 1.
Some knowledge of complexity thinking and of the earlier work of Derrida is required for the argument in this paper. Brief expositions will be provided, but for a detailed discussion of the characteristics of complex systems see Cilliers (1998). This text also develops the similarities between a critical theory of complexity and deconstruction exhaustively.
- 2.
It should be made explicit that not all forms of complexity theory share this critical sensitivity. Edgar Morin (2007) distinguishes between what he calls “restricted” and “general” theories of complexity. Restricted complexity acknowledges the relational nature of complex systems, but hopes that essential characteristics of these systems can be positively identified. This return to reduction is often encountered in forms of complexity theory which developed out of chaos theory. In particular, this includes many of the traditional positions on complexity associated with the Santa Fé Institute.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
A complex system is constituted through the relationships of differences. These relationships are non-linear. If the complexity is reduced, i.e. some of the difference is removed, it distorts our understanding of the system. Nevertheless, we have to reduce the complexity in order to be able to say something about the system at all. Because of the non-linearity, the magnitude of the resulting distortion cannot be predicted. Since we know this beforehand, we have to accept responsibility for these distortions. See Cilliers (2005) for a detailed discussion of this point.
- 6.
The nature of boundaries and the way in which they are enabling is discussed in Cilliers (2001).
- 7.
A related argument is provided by Anthony Wilden (1984: 155–195) when he distinguishes, in a fundamental way, between the digital and the analogue. For a collection of “differences” to become a “distinction”, i.e. a carrier of meaning, it must become a “discrete element with well-defined boundaries” (169).
- 8.
This point can also be elaborated from the perspective of self-organised criticality. This perspective helps to resist a too close association between chaos theory and structured complexity. A non-linear interaction between a few components can produce chaos, but “chaos theory cannot explain complexity” (Bak 1996: 31). A complex network of interactions will constrain chaotic behaviour.
- 9.
A has meaning because of its relationship with B and C and D and F. Nevertheless, this list cannot be infinite.
- 10.
Such “one”, specific relationship of the many relationships associated with a component is what I understand under Derrida’s notion of the “trace”. It is, of course, not possible to give conceptual content to a trace, despite the fact that there “is” nothing but traces. See footnote 1.
- 11.
It should be kept in mind that the constrained system of differences does not generate meaning in a static way, but that it is a dynamic process which could be described through the notion of différance.
- 12.
The word “identity” has a number of meanings, often shading into each other. It can refer to something singular (oneness) or to things which cannot be distinguished and thus are “identical”. The notion of “personal identity” has to do with what makes a person identifiable as that person, and not another, with what it is which “makes up” a person (or an institution). In the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, identity thinking refers to the mistake which “aims at the subsumption of all particular objects under general definitions and/or a unitary system of concepts” (Held 1980: 202). Particular identities are sacrificed in favour of a universal identity. “Identity thinking” is therefore another example of a modernist resistance to difference. In this paper the term is used to indicate, on the one hand, the complexly interwoven relationship between the different and the same and, on the other, the construction of (personal) identity through relationships of difference.
- 13.
For a different, more political discussion of this issue in the context of Eastern Europe, see Matuštík (1995).
- 14.
This insight can be used to criticise Levinas’ understanding of the Other as something absolute, as opposed to Derrida’s understanding of the other as something more richly differentiated. See Cornell (1992: 68–72).
- 15.
This position can also be formulated in terms of Derrida’s notion of “iterability”. See Signature, Event Context in Derrida (1988a).
- 16.
These ideas are developed in Cilliers (2006).
- 17.
The source of this organisation is a complex issue beyond the scope of our discussion here. Although some systems have a certain organisation imposed on them, complex systems can also develop their structure through processes of self-organisation and evolution, independently of an external designer.
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Cilliers, P. (2010). Difference, Identity and Complexity. In: Cilliers, P., Preiser, R. (eds) Complexity, Difference and Identity. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9187-1_1
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