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Some Fundamental Concepts of Constitutive Phenomenology

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The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973)

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 194))

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Abstract

All the preceding discussions which have led us to establish organization as an autochthonous feature of experience and to lay down some fundamental concepts of Gestalt theory were carried out in a psychological setting. Thus far we were not concerned with philosophical problems in the proper sense or with phenomenology. However, it is for the sake of the phenomenological theory of consciousness that we were engaged in psychological discussions. The concept of Gestalt-coherence and other related concepts will be utilized in Part IV in order to advance the phenomenological theory of perception.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The term “object” is here used in the most inclusive sense so as to denote whatever may be a topic of discourse, thinking, or apprehension of any kind whatsoever.

  2. 2.

    Husserl, “Nachwort zu meinen ‘Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,’” II pp. 565 ff., Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, vol. 9, 1930; see also the references given below, p. 390, Note 53.

  3. 3.

    Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (Descartes, Philosophical Writings, The Modern Library) pp. 190–191.

  4. 4.

    Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, translated by D. Cairns (The Hague, 1960), p. 1.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., Section 10.

  6. 6.

    Concerning the historical affiliations of phenomenology see Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomeno1ogischen Philosophie, (referred to hereafter as Ideen, §62): “Nachwort zu meinen ‘Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,’” loc. cit., pp. 563 ff.; Formale und transzendentale Logik (referred to hereafter as Logik), pp. 226 ff.: “Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie,” §§16 ff., Husserliana, vol. 6, (Haag, 1954); see also G. Berger, “Husserl et Hume,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. I, 1939.

  7. 7.

    See Husserl, Ideen, §27 ff. and Farber, loc. cit., pp. 522 ff. as to “natural attitude.”

  8. 8.

    Husserl, Ideen, pp. 52 ff.

  9. 9.

    Here we cannot go beyond mentioning the complication which arises from a secondary existential belief, viz. belief in the validity of scientific elaboration and the constructed universe of physics, being added to, or rather founded upon, the primary existential belief in the perceptual world.

  10. 10.

    Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1922), pp. 554 ff., considers Malebranche as the first genuine psychologist in modern philosophy.

  11. 11.

    We have discussed a few examples which illustrate that analogy in our article, “La place de la psychologie dans l’ensemble des sciences,” Revue de Synthèse, vol. 8, 1934, pp. 170 ff.; SPP, Chapter II.

  12. 12.

    Cf. the classical formulation of Helmholtz, Handbuch der physiologischen Optik, pp. 584 ff.

  13. 13.

    Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception, Introduction.

  14. 14.

    Part Three, Section IV.

  15. 15.

    Husserl, Ideen, §31 ff. and Abschnitt II, Chapter 4; Farber, loc. cit., pp. 526 ff.; see also the very clear presentation by A. Schutz, “Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology,” III, Social Research, vol. 12, 1945.

  16. 16.

    Cf. Farber, loc. cit., pp. 561 ff. Cf. infra, pp. 217 ff. for the difference between Farber’s position and ours as to transcendental phenomenology.

  17. 17.

    Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 19 f. “Meanwhile the world experienced in this reflectively grasped life goes on being for me (in a certain manner) ‘experienced’ as before, and with just the content it has at any particular time. It goes on appearing, as it appeared before; the only difference is that I, as reflecting philosophically, no longer keep in effect (no longer accept) the natural believing in existence involved in experiencing the world—though that believing too is still there and grasped by my noticing regard.”

  18. 18.

    We shall present an account of that clarification in Part IV, Chapter 1, Section VIb.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Husserl, Ideen, §§47 ff. and 142; Logik, §§61, 94 f., and 104; Cartesian Meditations, §§7 f. and 40 f.

  20. 20.

    Cf. Husserl, Ideen, p. 142.

  21. 21.

    Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 19 ff. and 32 ff., “… the whole world, when one is in the phenomenological attitude, is not accepted as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon.” A very clear presentation of the phenomenological reduction from the point of view of its function to disclose the world as a phenomenon has been given by G. Berger, Le Cogito dans la philosophie de Husserl, Chapter 3. Berger writes (p. 54), “Ce qui s’opére, dans la réduction phénoménologique, c’est moins le passage de l’object au sujet, que la prise de conscience du monde en tant qu’object, en tant que phénomène—qua cogitatum— … il y a une catégorie plus profonde que celle d’être ou de non-être, c’est celle d’objet pensé.” (Italics mine.)

  22. 22.

    Cf. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 35 f.

  23. 23.

    The concept of perceptual noema will be defined in Section V of this part.

  24. 24.

    Here we mention the problems of constitution only briefly, because we shall discuss them at greater length in Part IV.

  25. 25.

    Supra, pp. 156 f.

  26. 26.

    Köhler emphatically insists upon the distinction between body and organism; Cf. Gestalt Psychology, pp. 7 and 22 note: “If the chair is seen ‘before me,’ the ‘me’ of this phrase means my body as an experience, of course, not my organism as an object of the physical world.” As far as I can see, the distinction in question was first made by M. Scheler, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 361 ff. The mentioned substitution, as Sartre points out (L’Etre el le Néant, pp. 365 ff.), depends upon the body being considered, not as it is experienced by the living, embodied, and involved subject, but rather as it appears to an onlooking, disinterested, and detached observer. Merleau-Ponty has set forth, in La Structure du Comportement, (Paris, 1942), pp. 195 ff. and 256 ff., the difficulties which beset a merely explanatory biology and, in general, the conception of the body as a physical system. Over and against that conception, he insists upon the “corps phénoménal” as the subject-matter of biological science; see also Phénoménologie de la Perception, pp. 110 ff., 122 ff., and 403 f.

  27. 27.

    Köhler, loc. cit., p. 7, “To the influence of … physical objects my organism responds with processes which establish the sensory world around me. Further processes in the organism give rise to the sensory thing which I call my body”; p. 22 note, “My body is the outcome of certain processes in my physical organism … exactly as the chair before me is the final product of other processes in the same physical organism.”

  28. 28.

    Cf. our article, “Phänomenologie der Thematik und des reinen Ich,” Chapter I, Anhang, loc. cit., in which we have ventured the first phenomenological interpretation of Gestalt theory; in SPP as “Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation between Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology,” Chapter X, p. 193 ff.

  29. 29.

    Supra, p. 162.

  30. 30.

    Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception, pp. 72 ff.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., pp. 40 and 65.

  32. 32.

    Cf. ibid., pp. XI ff.

  33. 33.

    Cf. ibid., pp. V ff.

  34. 34.

    Cf. the contrary view advocated by Merleau-Ponty, La Structure du Comportement, pp. 177 ff. and 256 ff.; Phénoménologie de la Perception, pp. 58 ff. and 112 ff.

  35. 35.

    Supra, pp. 160 ff.

  36. 36.

    Husserl, Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, §§9 ff., has set forth the philosophical problems involved in the very existence of modem physics (i.e., since the time of Galileo) and he has shown that the idea of physics in the modem sense has motivated that of a naturalistic psychology.

  37. 37.

    Part IV, Chapter 1, Section I f.

  38. 38.

    Part IV, Chapter 2, Section III.

  39. 39.

    Cf. Part IV, Chapter 2, Section II.

  40. 40.

    Cf. our article, “On the Intentionality of Consciousness,” II, Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. by M. Farber, (Cambridge, Mass. 1940); in SPP, Chapter VII.

  41. 41.

    Cf. Husserl, Ideen, §§41, 88, and 97.

  42. 42.

    As to the mentioned relationship, Cf. Part IV, Chapter 1, Section VI.1.

  43. 43.

    Part IV, Chapter 1, Section I.

  44. 44.

    Cf. Husserl, Ideen, pp. 207 ff.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., p. 182.

  46. 46.

    Entering into a detailed discussion of the concept of intentionality, which is of fundamental importance for phenomenology, would lead us far beyond the limits of the present investigation. We refer to Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2 V, Chapter 2 (Farber. loc. cit., Chapter 12B): Ideen, Abschnitt II, Chapter 2; Abschnitt III, Chapters 3 and 4; Abschnitt IV, Chapter 1; Cartesian Meditations, II; see also our article, “On the Intentionality of Consciousness,” loc. cit. and SPP, Chapter VII.

  47. 47.

    Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, Sections 11 and 29 ff.; see also Farber, loc. cit., pp. 228 ff. and 240 f. The distinction between meanings as ideal units and mental states as real psychological events (acts), through which meanings are apprehended and actualized, is one of the most momentous and most consequential achievements for which modern philosophy is indebted to Husserl. It is this distinction that underlies Husserl’s anti-psychologism; Cf. Log. Unt., vol. I, Chapter 3 f. and 7 f.; Farber, loc. cit., Chapters 4, D, F, G; see also Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, Part II, Chapter I.

  48. 48.

    Cf. Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, pp. 44 and 103 f.; Cf. Farber loc. cit., pp. 242 ff.

  49. 49.

    Cf. Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, Section 12; Cf. Farber, loc. cit., pp. 229 ff.

  50. 50.

    Husserl, loc. cit., vol. 2, V, Section 20 f. and VI, Section 25; Cf. Farber, loc. cit., Chapter 12B, 9, and 10 and Chapter 13C, 10.

  51. 51.

    Husserl, loc. cit., vol. 2, 1, p. 415, “… die Materie (scl. muss) als dasjenige im Akte gelten, was ihm allererst die Beziehung auf ein Gegenständliches verleiht, und zwar diese Beziehung in so vollkommener Bestimmtheit, dass durch die Materie nicht nur das Gegenständliche überhaupt, welches der Akt meint, sondern auch die Weise, in welcher er es meint, felt bestimmt ist. Die Materie ist die im phänomenologischen Inhalt des Aktes liegende Eigenheit desselben, die es nicht nur bestimmt, dass der Akt die jeweilige Gegenständlichkeit auffasst, sondern auch als was er sie auffasst ….”

  52. 52.

    Ibid., vol. 2, 1, p. 418.

  53. 53.

    Cf. ibid., vol. 2, 1, p. 400, for the distinction between “Gegenstand so wie er intendiert ist” and “Gegenstand, welcher intendiert ist.”

  54. 54.

    Ibid., vol. 2, 1, p. 420.

  55. 55.

    Husserl, Ideen, p. 184.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., §§91 and 130.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., pp. 209 and 213.

  58. 58.

    Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, pp. 411 ff.

  59. 59.

    Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, §16 a.

  60. 60.

    Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, pp. 54 ff. and 372 f.; vol. 2, III, Section 12; Farber, loc. cit., pp. 231 ff., 324 f., and 341 f.

  61. 61.

    Cf. Husserl, loc. cit., vol. 2, I, Section 14 and vol. 2, VI Chapters 1; Farber, loc. cit., p. 230 and Chapter 13A.

  62. 62.

    Supra, pp. 158 ff.

  63. 63.

    Husserl, Ideen, pp. 182 ff., 187 f., §97; Cartesian Meditations, pp. 32 f.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., p. 180, “… anstatt in der Wahrnehmung lebend, dem Wahrgenommenen betrachtend und thematisierend zugewendet zu sein den Blick vielmehr auf das Wahrnehmen zu richten, bzw. auf die Eigenheiten der Gegebenheitsweise des Wahrgenommenen.”

  65. 65.

    Supra, pp. 161 f.

  66. 66.

    Cf. Husserl, Ideen, pp. 278 ff.

  67. 67.

    G. Berger, Le Cogito dans la philosophie de Husserl, (Paris, 1941), p. 96.

  68. 68.

    Husserl, Ideen, p. 184. As to the importance of phenomenology for descriptive psychology, understood as a science in the “natural attitude” and the potential reform of psychology, implied in phenomenology, Cf. Husserl, “Nachwort zu meinen ‘Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,’” loc. cit., Section 6.

  69. 69.

    Cf. e.g., Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, pp. 88 ff. For Husserl’s use of the term “appearance” as synonymous with perceptual noema, Cf. Ideen, §133.

  70. 70.

    Cf. Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, pp. 421 ff., and Ideen, §§43, 52, and 90.

  71. 71.

    Infra, 214 f., 220 ff., 226 f.

  72. 72.

    Part IV, Chapters 2, Sections 1, 3, and 7b.

  73. 73.

    James, The Principles of Psychology, vo1. 1, p. 275.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., vol. 1, p. 276.

  75. 75.

    R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, vol. 1, p. 75.

  76. 76.

    Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, pp. 400 f., Cf. Farber, loc. cit., p. 349.

  77. 77.

    Husserl, Ideen, p. 194; Cf. also Formale und transzendentale Logik, §45 and infra, pp. 305 ff.

  78. 78.

    As Dewey has pointed out in his article, “The vanishing subject in the psychology of James,” (Journal of Philosophy, vol. 37, 1940, pp. 591 ff.), there is, in James’s The Principles of Psychology, besides the descriptive and subjective strain, a trend towards a “biological behavioristic account of psychological phenomena.” If fully and consistently developed, the trend in question leads to a psychology not only without ‘soul’ but also without consciousness. (Cf. also E. G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 501). Far from denying that the trend which Dewey emphasizes exists even in James’s earlier period and that it has come to prevail in James’s later development, we nonetheless submit that the subjective and descriptive strain proves more fruitful not only from the point of view of philosophy but also from that of psychology itself. Incidentally, we wish to remark that the question concerning consciousness must not be confounded with that of a “substantial soul,” “permanent mind,” or “substantial subject” (Dewey, loc. cit., p. 590), briefly the Ego conceived of as carrier, possessor, or subject of consciousness. D. S. Miller, “A debt to James,” (In Commemoration of William James. New York, 1942 p. 29) has emphasized that distinction. Throughout his article, (especially pp. 25 ff.), Miller insists on James’s descriptive and subjective orientation in which—rightly we think—he sees one of the most significant and important contributions for which we are indebted to the author of The Principles of Psychology.

  79. 79.

    James, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 276. “Our psychological duty is to cling as closely as possible to the actual constitution of the thought we are studying.”

  80. 80.

    Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 195 and 277 ff.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 196 and 278, “We have the inveterate habit, whenever we try introspectively to describe one of our thoughts, of dropping the thought as it is in itself and talking of something else. We describe the things that appear to the thought and we describe other thoughts about those things—as if these and the original thought were the same.”

  82. 82.

    Cf. supra, pp. 25 ff.

  83. 83.

    James, loc. cit., vol. 1, pp. 231 ff.

  84. 84.

    Boring, loc. cit., p. 499.

  85. 85.

    James, loc. cit., vol. 1, pp. 183 ff.

  86. 86.

    Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 218 ff.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., vol. 1, p. 216.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 172 f.

  89. 89.

    James, “On some Omissions of Introspective Psychology,” loc. cit., p. 21, “… different mental states can contemplate, and know that they mean to contemplate, the same objective matter, quality, thing, or truth.”

  90. 90.

    James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, pp. 459 ff. “The same matters can be thought of in successive portions of the mental stream, and some of these portions can know that they mean the same matters which the other portions meant.”

  91. 91.

    Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 174 ff.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 236 ff.

  93. 93.

    Ibid., vol. 1, p. 252.

  94. 94.

    Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 486 ff.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., vol. 1, p. 233.

  96. 96.

    Perry, loc. cit., vol. 2, pp. 72 ff.

  97. 97.

    Cf. our brief sketch of the philosophy of “radical empiricism,” supra, pp. 13 ff.

  98. 98.

    A. Gurwitsch, “On the Object of Thought,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 7, 1947; in SPP, Chapter VII.

  99. 99.

    Husserl, Ideen, §7.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., §§2 and 16. Here we leave out of account the “formal” or “analytic” region, i.e., that which Husserl calls “apophantic logic” and “formal ontology”; as to that region, see ibid., §10 and especially Formale und transzendentale Logik, Abschnitt I, A; also supra, pp. 142 ff.

  101. 101.

    As to the concept of “Euclidean manifold,” Cf. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, Abschnitt I, Chapters 3.

  102. 102.

    Cf. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §90.

  103. 103.

    Husserl, Ideen, §§8 f.

  104. 104.

    Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, II §§45 f. and 52; Ideen, §3; Formale und transzendentale Logik, §58; see also Farber, loc. cit., pp. 455 ff. and 462 f.

  105. 105.

    As to “primordial self-presentation,” a concept of utmost importance for phenomenology. Cf. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 10 ff., and Formale und transzendentale Logik, §§59 ff.

  106. 106.

    Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, §§87 ff. We have formulated some phenomenological problems concerning ideation and the method of “free variation” in our article, “Gelb-Goldstein’s concept of ‘concrete’ and ‘categorial’ attitude and the phenomenology of ideation” III, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 10, 1949 and SPP, Chapter III.

  107. 107.

    Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, p. 411, “Es zeigt sich … dass durch diese Mannigfaltigkeit von Nachgestaltungen eine Einheit hindurchgeht, dass bei solchen freien Variationen eines Urbilds, z.B. eines Dinges, in Notwendigkeit eine Invariante erhalten bleibt als die notwendige allqemeine Form, ohne die ein derartiges wie dieses Ding, als Exempel seiner Art, überhaupt undenkbar wäre.”

  108. 108.

    Husserl, Ideen. pp. 12 ff. “… (wir) können, ein Wesen selbst und originär zu erfassen, von entsprechenden erfahrenden Anschauungen ausgehen, ebensowohl aber auch von nicht-erfahrenden, nicht-daseinserfassenden, vielmehr ‘bloss einbildenden’ Anschauungen.” Cf. also Cartesian Meditations, pp. 70 f.

  109. 109.

    Cf. our article “Gelb-Goldstein’s concept of ‘concrete’ and ‘categorial’ attitude and the phenomenology of ideation,” loc. cit., pp. 194 ff. and SPP, Chapter III.

  110. 110.

    Cf. Husserl, Ideen, §70.

  111. 111.

    Ibid., §4.

  112. 112.

    Husserl. Erfahrung und Urteil, p. 426. “Was im phantasiemässigen Belieben … sich ineinander variieren lässt, trägt eine notwendige Struktur in sich, ein Eidos, und damit Gesetze der Notwendigkeit, die bestimmen, was einem Gegenstand notwendig zukommen muss, wenn er ein Gegenstand dieser Art soll sein können Diese Notwendigkeit gilt dann mit für alles Faktische.”

  113. 113.

    Supra, pp. 79 ff.

  114. 114.

    Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, III, §5; Cf. Farber, loc. cit., pp. 287 ff.

  115. 115.

    Husserl, Log. Unt., vol. 2, 1, pp. 235 ff., “Die Lostrennbarkeit besagt nichts anderes, als dass wir diesen Inhalt in der Vorstellung identisch festhalten können bei schrankenloser (willkürlicher, durch kein im Wesen des Inhalts gründendes Gesetz verwehrter) Variation der mitverbundenen und überhaupt mitgegebenen Inhalte; und dasselbe besagt, dass er durch Aufhebung jedes beliebigen Bestandes mitgegebener Inhalte unberührt bliebe.”

  116. 116.

    Cf. Stumpf, Über den Psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, pp. 112 ff., and Husserl, loc. cit., vol. 2, III, §4; see also Farber, loc. cit., pp. 285 ff.

  117. 117.

    Husserl, loc. cit., vol. 2, III, §7; Farber, loc. cit., pp. 289 ff.

  118. 118.

    Husserl, loc. cit., vol. 2, IV, §10; Cf. Farber, loc. cit., Chapters 11, H.

  119. 119.

    See Husserl, loc. cit., vol. 2, IV, §12, for the difference between nonsense and absurdity; Cf. Farber, loc. cit., Chapters 11, J.

  120. 120.

    Husserl, loc. cit., vol. 2, IV, §§13 f.; Formale und transzendentale Logik, §§13; Cf. Farber, loc. cit., Chapters 11, K ff.

  121. 121.

    Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, pp. 427 ff. “Wirklichkeiten nach den Gesetzen ihrer reinen Möglichkeiten beurteilen, oder sie nach ‘Wesensgesetzen’, nach apriorischen Gesetzen beurteilen, ist eine universale, auf jederlei Wirklichkeit zu beziehende und durchaus notwendige Aufgabe.”

  122. 122.

    See Husserl, Ideen, §§34 and 63.

  123. 123.

    In our article, “On the Intentionality of Consciousness,” Sections III and IV, loc. cit., we have brought out as universal invariants of consciousness the temporality of acts of consciousness and the correspondence between acts, considered as temporal events, and noemata. On that basis we have come to advocate a correlation conception of consciousness. SPP, Chapter VII, Section III and IV.

  124. 124.

    Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2nd. ed.), p. 25. “Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegenständen, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, sofern diese a priori möglich sein soll, überhaupt beschäftigt”; Cf. p. 197, “… die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung.”

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Gurwitsch*, A. (2010). Some Fundamental Concepts of Constitutive Phenomenology. In: Zaner, R. (eds) The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973). Phaenomenologica, vol 194. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3346-8_6

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