Abstract
In this paper, we outline some potential conflicts that platform owners and software developers face in mobile application markets. Our arguments are based on comments captured in specialized online discussion forums, in which developers gather to share knowledge and experiences. The key findings indicate conflicts of interests, including 1) intra-platform competition, 2) discriminative promotion, 3) entry prevention, 4) restricted monetization, 5) restricted knowledge sharing, 6) substitution, and 7) strategic technology selection. Opportunistic platform owners may use their power to discriminate between third-part software developers. However, there are also potential strategic solutions that developers can apply; for example diversification (multi-homing), syndication and brand building.
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Salminen, J., Teixeira, J. (2013). Fool’s Gold? Developer Dilemmas in a Closed Mobile Application Market Platform. In: Järveläinen, J., Li, H., Tuikka, AM., Kuusela, T. (eds) Co-created Effective, Agile, and Trusted eServices. ICEC 2013. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 155. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39808-7_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39808-7_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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